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In this thesis, I consider affordable housing disaster resilience in the neoliberal era 
through an investigation of the Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) program in 
Galveston, Texas, through Hurricane Ike, which made landfall there in September, 2008. 
Considerable research has explicated the ways in which natural disaster has intensified 
ongoing neoliberal pressure to shrink the welfare state and create new markets for capital 
accumulation, especially through the dismantling of traditional public housing. The 
purpose of this research was to inquire whether the LIHTC, a product of neoliberal 
innovation and the most significant low-income rental housing production subsidy in the 
United States, has produced housing that may serve as a resource for resilience for its 
residents in the face of these challenges. This involved the coding and synthesis of 
datasets and documentation from a variety of local, state, and federal entities in order to 
develop a detailed narrative. A high-profile struggle over the demolition and 
 vii
reconstruction of traditional public housing in Galveston following the hurricane served 
as a comparative case for the examination of LIHTC housing in the same historical 
geography, suggesting how features of neoliberalism were manifest in the local context. 
The inquiry into underlying vulnerabilities and institutional frameworks around LIHTC 
housing and the material history of storm impacts and restoration revealed a stark 
contrast with that of public housing there, though considerations of resilience remain 
challenged by the contingent nature of neoliberal actualization and the contradictions 
present within the LIHTC itself. A query of secondary sources intended to triangulate 
primary research findings revealed that LIHTC housing in Galveston played a significant 
discursive role in the struggle over public housing resilience well after the restoration of 
LIHTC housing and revealed latent vulnerabilities that may pose a future challenge to the 
resilience of Galveston’s LIHTC resident communities. The findings of this research 
suggest some of the specific contingencies upon which the actualization of threats to 
resilience may depend, challenging constructs of affordability and disaster resilience in 
the neoliberal context.  
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In an era of increasing economic inequality and insecurity, affordable housing is an 
essential resource for social resilience, particularly for low-income people. The need is 
especially acute in communities beset by natural disaster, where the home may serve first 
as shelter through a storm and subsequently as an anchor through swells of post-disaster 
struggle. While meteorological and seismic events strike indiscriminately, their effects 
correspond to geographic and demographic distributions of vulnerability produced through 
social structures and processes (Peacock et al., 2014). Whether a disaster serves to actualize 
these vulnerabilities and results in permanent housing loss and displacement is contingent 
upon the capacity of communities to access resources for resilience, not simply to 
environmental systems, but against political and market-driven pressures to transform 
urban space in a manner that would exclude them. 
In the neoliberal political economy, where direct social provision of affordable 
housing for low-income residents continues to be phased out in favor of subsidizing 
profitable private development, the right to housing and the right to the city are far from 
guaranteed. Considerable research has been dedicated to explicating the ways in which 
natural disaster has intensified ongoing neoliberal pressure to dismantle the welfare state 
and create new markets for capital accumulation, with particular attention to the loss of 
public housing in New Orleans following Hurricane Katrina in 2005. However, it appears 
that less is known about how other, more recently developed low-income housing models 
function in this complex context. Since its creation in 1986, the Low-Income Housing Tax 
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Credit (LIHTC) program has become the most significant funding source for place-based 
low-income rental housing development in the United States. However, the program is a 
product of neoliberal innovation that contains within it contradictions that obscure the role 
of LIHTC housing as a potential site of vulnerability or resilience for its residents.  
In this thesis, I present an exploratory, comparative case study of LIHTC housing 
in the city of Galveston, Texas, through Hurricane Ike, which made landfall there on 
September 13, 2008. Galveston was selected due to a high-profile struggle over the 
demolition and reconstruction of traditional public housing following the hurricane, which 
serves as a comparative case. While some vulnerabilities may have been shared between 
public and LIHTC housing, institutional frameworks and processes diverged significantly, 
resulting in very different material outcomes. 
The findings of this research address, though they do not fully ameliorate, a gap in 
existing scholarship with serious practical implications for both housing policy and disaster 
resilience planning, calling into question whether communities can expect to rely on 
neoliberal low-income housing models such as the LIHTC to accomplish and sustain social 
welfare goals. Moreover, these considerations both articulate and challenge theoretical 




Chapter 1: Literature review. The literature review articulates the analytic 
framework for this thesis by connecting key concepts of neoliberalism, the history of 
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affordable housing policy in the United States, recent actualizations of neoliberalism in 
low-income housing through natural disaster, and the LIHTC. Neoliberalism refers to shifts 
in political and economic discourse, policy, and social relations that have had significant 
impacts on social welfare systems, not least of all that of affordable housing in the United 
States. The associated revanchism of both space and governance has produced a range of 
challenges against which communities must struggle for resilience. Constructs of resilience 
and alternatives for its operationalization are considered briefly in this chapter. The final 
section of this chapter considers the LIHTC and its history, mechanics, common critiques, 
and established procedures for addressing casualty loss and noncompliance as the result of 
natural disaster in order to enable an understanding of the LIHTC within the context of 
neoliberalism and its challenges to resilience. 
Chapter 2: Research design. This chapter articulates the research design that 
served to guide this thesis, beginning with an introduction to the selected case and the 
overall approach of the study. The chapter continues by outlining a series of research 
questions to investigate LIHTC housing in Galveston through Hurricane Ike, 
vulnerabilities that may have been produced, institutional frameworks involved, material 
histories of LIHTC housing through the storm, struggles for resilience that may have 
occurred, and what all of this suggests for key constructs. Hypotheses are offered where 
possible. The next section outlines each data source and the methodologies used to collect, 
analyze, and interpret them. Most of these sources were publicly available from 
government agencies, either through online query or by personal request. The analysis was 
largely qualitative and involved coding for material history to develop a detailed narrative, 
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though some quantitative analysis was also necessary for this purpose. Secondary sources 
were used to triangulate the findings and to develop the background chapter as a point of 
comparison. The final section considers the potential implications of the findings of this 
research for scholars, policymakers, and planners, the validity of the research design and 
its ability to address the research questions using the selected constructs, sources, and 
methodologies, and certain limitations of the research and to the conclusions that can be 
drawn from it. 
Chapter 3: Background. This chapter traces the struggle over the restoration of 
public housing in Galveston after Hurricane Ike as the comparative case for inquiry into 
LIHTC housing there. The chapter includes consideration of vulnerabilities actualized 
through the storm, not only in physical and social terms, but also in terms of political and 
economic pressures from within the institutional framework of public housing. Outside of 
this framework, both advocates and opponents of public housing restoration attempted to 
struggle for their interests and leverage various sources of power. The results of these 
struggles included the production of new components of the institutional framework of 
public housing that had not previously existed and which will be instrumental to its 
restoration, should it eventually be completed. The results of this background research not 
only served as a point of comparison, but greatly influenced the design of the exploration 
of LIHTC housing. 
Chapter 4: Findings. This final chapter presents the findings of the primary 
research into LIHTC housing in Galveston through Hurricane Ike. The inquiry into 
underlying vulnerabilities and institutional frameworks around LIHTC housing revealed a 
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context that in some ways resembled what was hypothesized but diverged in other, 
potentially consequential ways. The chapter then traces the material history of storm 
impacts and restoration, showing a stark contrast with that of public housing in the same 
historical geography. This, in turn, produces a very different context for potential struggles, 
though considerations of resilience remain challenged by the contingent nature of 
neoliberal actualization and the contradictions present within the LIHTC itself. Finally, an 
unexpected finding is presented. In a query of secondary sources intended simply to 
triangulate primary research findings, I discovered that LIHTC housing in Galveston had 
actually played a significant discursive role in the struggle over public housing resilience 
well after its own restoration. This discovery revealed a set of latent vulnerabilities that, 
while not yet actualized through Hurricane Ike, may pose a threat to LIHTC resident 
communities in Galveston sometime in the future. Further research is suggested to better 
understand the specific contingencies upon which the actualization of such threats to 
resilience may depend.  
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Chapter 1: Literature Review 
 
Affordable Housing Policy in the Neoliberal Era 
The neoliberal turn. Neoliberalism is a contested but useful construct for 
describing shifts in political and economic discourse, policy, and social relations that have 
been observed globally, nationally, and locally for at least four decades and have had 
significant impacts on social welfare systems, not least of all that of affordable housing in 
the United States. The neoliberal turn in U.S. low-income rental housing policy appeared 
through the gradual abandonment and dismantling of traditional public housing and the 
introduction of a variety of mechanisms to incentivize development by the private sector. 
Before considering these specific changes, it is important to articulate key constructs of 
neoliberalism in order to better understand the context for the development of the LIHTC 
and the challenges of disaster resilience. 
Neoliberal theory is built upon classical economic liberalism and the belief that all 
of human activity should occur within unencumbered markets to optimize growth, 
efficiency, and fairness. Market exchange is thereby considered an "ethic in itself" (Harvey, 
2005, p. 3) whose "corollary [is a] declining confidence in the capacity of states" (Hall & 
Lamont, 2013, p. 4), which has been used to justify a radical redefinition of the role of the 
state centered on the protection, maintenance, and even creation of markets rather than the 
direct provision of social goods. Though neoliberal discourse is often built on notions of 
freedom, it is important to understand that the neoliberal framework emphasizes certain 
rights and freedoms (e.g., exclusive private property rights, free and deregulated markets 
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and trade—essentially, the freedom to profit) over others (e.g., rights to the commons, the 
city, access to opportunity, self-determination, collective action, social and environmental 
justice; freedom from hunger, homelessness, poverty) (Harvey, 2005). 
Renewed commitment to these beliefs is attributed in large part to the work of 
Chicago School economist and Reagan advisor Milton Friedman (e.g., Klein, 2007). By 
the end of the 1980s, Friedman’s ideas had come to characterize what has been called the 
"Washington consensus," or "the common core of wisdom embraced by all serious 
economists" (Williamson, cited in Klein, 2007, p. 204) as the basis for sound economic 
policy both nationally and globally. Of course, the delineation of "serious" economists 
according to their adherence to neoliberal ideology is but one part of the construction of 
the hegemony of neoliberalism “as a mode of discourse... incorporated into the common-
sense way many of us interpret, live in, and understand the world" (Harvey, 2005, p. 3). 
As a policy framework, neoliberalism does not simply refer to a return to laissez-
faire political economics, but a strategic and mutually-supportive combination of public 
sector retrenchment and private sector revanchism that constitutes what Harvey (2005) has 
called a "restoration of class power" (p. 68) in response to the Keynesian or New Deal era 
of "class compromise" (p. 10) that had embedded capitalism within certain constraints and 
built beside it the—rather precarious—welfare state. Neoliberal intervention co-opts the 
tools of the state to remove impediments to accumulation and redistribute common assets 
to private capital through, in various arrangements, reduction of direct social welfare 
expenditure, divestment of state assets, relinquishment of responsibility for social services 
provision, and deregulation of market activity (Harvey, 2005). 
  8
Spaces once won through class struggle and maintained in collective purview have 
been transformed into sites of private profit. Klein (2007) has called this a new 
"colonialism" in which "the state itself would be the new frontier, its public services and 
assets auctioned off for far less than they were worth" (p. 70). However, despite this 
apparent erosion of the state, Johnson (2011) has argued that the state has simply redirected 
its resources to support capital accumulation, even creating space for entirely new markets 
and industries (of which the LIHTC, discussed later this chapter, is but one example). It is 
the exercise of class power within systems of governance to accomplish this political 
economic restructuring that distinguishes neoliberalism as a capitalist class project 
(Harvey, 2005).  
The hegemony of neoliberal theory has not gone uncontested, however, and the 
imposition of market logic on the whole of human life has inspired struggle over the bounds 
of acceptable frameworks and possible futures (Hall and Lamont, 2013; Harvey, 2005). In 
fact, such struggles are largely responsible for the articulation of neoliberalism as a distinct 
construct, though this has produced in it both polysemy (Springer, 2012) and often 
pejorative connotations that must be acknowledged if it is to be deployed with validity 
(Evans and Sewell, 2013). Despite these complexities, I argue that neoliberalism serves as 
a useful construct perhaps nowhere more than in an examination of two overlapping moves 
in U.S. housing policy: the dismantling of traditional public housing, and its replacement 
with an array of market-oriented low-income rental housing programs. 
Dismantling public housing. Public housing in the United States began in the New 
Deal era of the Franklin Roosevelt administration and was renewed under the Fair Deal of 
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the Truman administration, in part as a strategy to clear tenement slums but also to spur 
consumption and investment in cities (Hackworth, 2007). Public housing faced challenges 
from the real estate and construction industries and from private property owners from the 
beginning, and its support was further eroded in the midst of the urban demographic 
changes and political upheavals of the 1960s (Goetz, 2013). The 1972 demolition of the 
massive Pruitt-Igoe housing project in St. Louis, Missouri, remains one of the most iconic 
representations of public housing failures in history, and solidified the notion that the entire 
public housing system had failed despite the argument that Pruitt-Igoe was not 
representative of the majority of public housing in the United States and that much of this 
housing remains successful (Goetz, 2013). 
By the time the Washington consensus had taken hold, public housing was "a 
product of a political economy that no longer exists" (Goetz, 2013, p. 6) but a series of 
policy changes were still needed to complete the dismantling of public housing and 
accomplish the neoliberal goal to “eliminate the words ‘public housing’ from our 
vocabulary” (Lipscomb, quoted in Goetz, p. 4). The first major step was taken in 1982, 
when the Reagan administration made deep cuts to funding for public housing that brought 
new construction to a drip (Goetz, 2013). Budget cuts also led to a process that Goetz 
(2013) has called de facto demolition, whereby public housing authorities forego 
maintenance on existing projects in order to produce conditions that later justify 
redevelopment. However, according to Goetz, it was the advent of the Housing 
Opportunities for People Everywhere (HOPE VI) program in 1993 under the 
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administration of Bill Clinton that truly heralded the end to public housing in the United 
States. 
 Through HOPE VI, federal block grants are awarded to housing authorities to 
redevelop distressed public housing projects. The program has largely been used to 
demolish rather than renovate existing projects and replace them with lower-density, 
mixed-income developments and has given priority to plans that leverage private finance, 
employ private property management, and are expected to promote further private 
investment in their area (Schwartz, 2010). HOPE VI legislation removed previous 
requirements of one-for-one replacement of demolished public housing and, by 2007, less 
than 60,000 low-income units had been rebuilt out of 150,000 demolished units (Schwartz, 
2010). Residents who are not given new units are typically offered tenant-based rental 
vouchers and must find accommodations in the private housing market. While residents of 
the new mixed-income developments may realize certain limited benefits, those given 
vouchers have often found themselves in areas that are just as racially and 
socioeconomically concentrated as, but geographically removed from and much less 
centrally-located than those they were made to leave (Wegmann & Christensen, 2016). 
Regardless, the result of HOPE VI has been a significant reduction in the overall public 
housing stock at a time when dire need persists. 
There has been no shortage of scholarship on the demolition of public housing in 
New Orleans following Hurricane Katrina in 2005, which will be considered later in this 
chapter. However, it is important to understand that New Orleans public housing was part 
of the larger effort to dismantle public housing in the United States long before Hurricane 
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Katrina. In the midst of increasing local real estate pressure, repeated audits of public 
housing in New Orleans by HUD documented serious deficiencies and a complete lack of 
preventative maintenance planning (Goetz, 2013). Though the local agenda to dismantle it 
had formed, federal forces were instrumental in actualizing it, with HUD using something 
of a tipping point argument to justify recommendation of complete privatization of New 
Orleans public housing and awarding some of the earliest HOPE VI grants to further the 
process of de facto demolition (Goetz, 2013). 
Neoliberal alternatives. As Peck and Tickell (2002), describe, neoliberalism often 
involves both “roll-back” of welfare state institutions, such as public housing, that impeded 
accumulation and “roll-out” of new institutions to support it, such as programs that make 
the housing of low-income residents profitable for private capital. Neoliberal interventions 
often rely on short-term rather than permanent commitments to maximize capital mobility 
(Harvey, 2005). This causes a dilemma when large numbers of market-oriented low-
income housing subsidies are set to expire at once and owners have the opportunity to 
reposition their properties. Unsurprisingly, the neoliberal response has been to preserve 
affordability through further market-oriented subsidies, “retain[ing] all of the costs of 
socially oriented preservation with none of the benefits” (Achtenberg, 2006, p. 300). 
The first experiment in federally subsidized private development of low-income 
rental housing began in 1961 under the Kennedy administration, but it appeared cost 
prohibitive and did not result in large scale production before its termination (Schwartz, 
2010). This was supplanted by a more successful program in 1968 in the final months of 
the Johnson administration, which Mallach (2009) marks as the point at which the state 
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was truly "redefined as the provider of financial subsidies to private developers or property 
owners [of low-income housing], a role that remains the same for all affordable housing 
programs enacted by the federal or state governments since" (p. 38). However, even this 
effort would be cut short in 1973 when the Nixon administration enacted an 18 month 
moratorium on all federal housing subsidies, which Orlebeke (2000) considers the critical 
junction that "squashed what was left of the spirit" of the preceding era of federal housing 
production (p. 245). 
 Rental vouchers, often referred to as Section 8 vouchers and later Housing Choice 
Vouchers, were authorized in 1974 under the new Ford administration and are perhaps 
most closely associated with U.S. low-income housing policy in the neoliberal era. The 
program comprises both tenant- and project-based vouchers, though the latter have largely 
been phased out in favor of the former. According to Marcuse (1978), vouchers aim to 
"throw into the private market those whose own resources would make their participation 
in it otherwise profitless," (p. 42) rather than to provide housing as a social good—though 
Marcuse also rejected the notion that previous forms of U.S. housing policy ever 
constituted a cohesive, benevolent effort. Proponents of vouchers have argued that 
traditional public housing traps residents in place while vouchers provide them with the 
freedom to choose the best place to live, though housing choices for low-income residents 
relying on vouchers are limited to locations where vouchers are accepted. The result has 
been the persistence of poverty concentration, racial segregation, and unequal access to 
opportunity for many voucher recipients (Wegmann & Christensen, 2016). 
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 With the Reagan administration’s repeal of the Section 8 New Construction 
program in 1983, few tools remained to incentivize the private provision of low-income 
rental housing. It was in this context that the Low Income Housing Tax Credit was created, 
discussed in greater detail later in this chapter. 
 
Neoliberalism and Natural Disaster 
 Actualization of neoliberalism. The production of the neoliberal state—its rise to 
hegemony as political ideology and economic theory, its translation to dominant public 
policy framework, and its establishment as actually existing social relationships and 
material geographies—is a "fragile, ad hoc, and contingent" process (Kamel, 2012, p. 453) 
The process is ad hoc—though certainly not impromptu—as it requires neoliberal actors 
to capitalize on opportunities as they arise, and it is contingent in that it is shaped by the 
impediments, barriers, frictions, and political struggles it encounters, leading to 
geographically and temporally irregular manifestations of the neoliberal political economy 
(Gotham & Greenberg, 2014).  It is not only that global and national neoliberal trends have 
local effects, but that individual cities are sites of unique articulations of neoliberalism 
through processes of actualization (Brenner and Theodore, 2002) and through the 
representation of localized market interests by neoliberal urban regimes (Newman and 
Ashton, 2004). 
Milton Friedman had argued that such change could only be produced through 
crisis, and advocated a strategy of preparing political economic alternatives to await 
actualization until the occurrence, production, or discursive construction of an event or 
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period of crisis (Klein, 2007). From earthquakes to economic recessions, disasters and 
crises have served to reduce political friction and shake loose geographic impediments to 
accelerated modes of capital accumulation (Harvey, 2005; Kamel, 2012). The prime 
directive of neoliberalism is to "tear down all non-market structures" (Robinson, quoted in 
Arena, 2012, p. xxi), sometimes quite literally. Disaster and crisis produce systemic 
rupture, creating space for new frameworks of governance to form or old systems to re-
root, driving subsequent patterns of development, and producing the context for future 
disasters (Gotham & Greenberg, 2014). 
Friedman himself saw such an opportunity for deepening ongoing processes of 
neoliberalization in New Orleans following Hurricane Katrina (Klein, 2007), where long 
existing redevelopment pressures were finally able to overcome remaining friction and 
remake New Orleans in the neoliberal image, not least of all by clearing impediments 
presented by various forms of low-income housing (Goetz, 2013; Johnson, 2011). Though 
the agenda to dismantle New Orleans had already been long underway, Hurricane Katrina 
accelerated the process to breakneck speed. Six of the largest public housing projects in 
New Orleans were closed after the storm and four were slated for demolition. Despite a 
lack of structural damage, officials claimed that rehabilitation would have been cost 
prohibitive (Goetz, 2013). Residents and their advocates sued, protested, and even made 
several attempts to forcibly reoccupy their homes, but all four projects were demolished by 
early 2008 with the support of city officials and HUD (Goetz, 2013).    
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 Discourses of disaster. Friedman argued that the crises required to produce change 
could be “actual or perceived” (quoted in Klein, 2007, p. 7); the construction of a discourse 
of crisis or disaster may be at least as important in creating opportunities for neoliberal 
actualization as material conditions and events upon which that discourse is supposedly 
based. Control over the narrative of a crisis is essential for control over ideas of the range 
of possible and appropriate responses to it (Russill & Lavin, 2011). Borrowing from 
Agamben, Gotham and Greenberg (2014) have explained that framing a discrete disaster 
event or an ongoing situation as a crisis produces a “state of exception,” enabling the 
circumvention of normal limits to power legitimated by the need for decisive action in 
extraordinary circumstances, even if such circumstances actually resemble the status quo. 
Klein (2007) has called sites of such exception "democracy-free zones—gaps in politics as 
usual when the need for consent and consensus do not seem to apply" (p. 175). 
 According to Klein (2007), the essence of Friedman’s strategy is to gain discursive 
control to capitalize on the "state of shock," or "a moment when there is a gap between 
fast-moving events and the information that exists to explain them" (p. 579); if power is 
exerted before negotiations over the framing of events can be resolved, “shocked societies 
often give up things they would otherwise fiercely protect" (p. 20). Within the neoliberal 
project, the narrative of a crisis as a crisis of the state itself is used to justify interventions 
that enable the state to be further colonized by private interests. In U.S. public housing, for 
example, problems faced by specific public housing developments and authorities have 
been generalized into a broader discourse of disaster that has been used to dismantle public 
housing not only in those specific geographies but as an institution of public policy 
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nationwide (Goetz, 2013). In post-Katrina New Orleans, Russill and Lavin (2011) explain, 
FEMA officials constructed a narrative that the agency had been pushed beyond the tipping 
point of its ability to manage the disaster; this narrative submerges how existing neoliberal 
policies had produced a landscape of vulnerabilities and allows them to be reproduced, or 
perhaps deepened. 
 Disaster resilience. In plain terms, to be resilient is to thrive in the face of 
challenge, but a more robust construct of resilience continues to be negotiated among 
academics (Reghezza-Zitt et al., 2012). Though often articulated in reference to a specific 
challenging event such as a natural disaster, resilience is not simply a precondition to or an 
outcome of a discrete occurrence. Rather, resilience comprises recursive processes of 
struggle over the futures of a community or system through disasters and other challenges, 
shaping subsequent production and reproduction of space (Gotham & Greenberg, 2014). 
Understanding this construct of resilience requires inquiry into these processes over time, 
across geographies, at multiple scales, and through dimensions of power, materiality, and 
meaning. Hall and Lamont (2013) explain that resilience cannot be defined by a return to 
some initial state that would enable similar actualizations of vulnerabilities the next time a 
disaster or shock occurs; a resilient system may need to change in order to become better 
prepared for future challenges. Constructs of resilience and vulnerability are often 
considered in tandem, not only as two sides of a unitary concept, but because struggles for 
resilience necessitate addressing underlying vulnerabilities, their production, and their 
actualization. 
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Neoliberalism is a framework that demands enormous resilience—adapting to and 
thriving in an insecure and rapidly changing world—but simultaneously dispossesses 
certain groups of their access to resources for that resilience. In its need to not only erode 
social welfare as an impediment to accumulation but to consume it as a source of 
accumulation, the neoliberal state reproduces the need for the social provision of resources 
for resilience, including affordable housing. Dunn (2013) explains how housing serves as 
such a resource for resilience, the security of the home through traumatic periods enabling 
the colonization of one’s future and thus the self. To date, neither the private housing 
market nor the traditional public housing system have provided low-income people with 
sufficient resources for individual resilience in the face of natural disaster and neoliberal 
opportunism. 
Social resilience for individuals, households, families, and communities comprises 
a complex web of relationships, struggles, and resources. To understand the full construct 
of social resilience within a particular housing system would require a comprehensive 
study with residents themselves. However, this is not the domain of this thesis, and the 
resulting limitations are discussed later in the paper. Alternatively, the resilience of a 
housing system could be investigated, without consideration of specific residents, as the 
capacity for the housing stock of a disaster-stricken geography to be restored in such a way 
as to house its population, perhaps accounting for adaptations in its physical and 
institutional composition. Instead, I construct affordable housing disaster resilience as the 
ability for housing to serve as a resource for resilience against natural disaster and the 
neoliberal pressures that actualize through them, as well as the everyday challenges of life 
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for low-income people. In this way, affordability actually functions as a component of this 
resource rather than merely an intersecting characteristic. 
 
The Low Income Housing Tax Credit 
Policy history. The global economic recession of the late 1970s and 1980s was a 
period of crisis in which the need for urban reinvestment was high but federal support for 
it had waned (Guthrie & McQuarrie, 2005). In response to "bottom-scraping” housing 
production in the United States (Orlebeke, 2000, p. 251), the United States Congress 
enacted the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, which promoted investment by 
permitting depreciation on real estate to be written off at an accelerated rate and claimed 
as a passive loss against tax liability for its investors. However, this measure was soon 
criticized for enabling wealthy investors to shelter so much of their liability as to avoid 
taxes altogether while disincentivizing the upkeep of their properties to maintain value, 
since the write-off was based on depreciation (Guthrie & McQuarrie, 2005). 
In order to correct this and other issues, Congress enacted the Tax Reform Act of 
1986. As Congress prepared to close this loophole, affordable housing developers and 
advocates realized that this would eliminate one of the only remaining incentives for 
private low-income housing investment (Erickson, 2009), as the Section 8 New 
Construction program had been repealed three years earlier and the Community 
Reinvestment Act of 1977 had not proved powerful enough on its own (Guthrie & 
McQuarrie, 2005). In response to these concerns, the Low Income Housing Tax Credit (the 
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mechanics of which are described in the next subsection) was placed into the legislation as 
a three-year demonstration program. 
 Though the LIHTC was seemingly targeted to individual developers, it quickly 
catalyzed the creation of an entire industry and complex institutional framework around 
the development of projects leveraged with LIHTCs and the financialization of the credit 
itself (Guthrie & McQuarrie, 2005). This was in part the work of institutional actors who 
personally "had feet in both [nonprofit community development and for-profit 
development and lending] communities" (p. 36), had lobbied in support of the LIHTC 
legislation, and were responsible for establishing some of the first tax credit syndication 
agencies as subsidiaries of organizations such as the Local Initiatives Support Coalition 
(LISC) and the Enterprise Foundation (now Enterprise Community Partners). Within the 
first few years, corporate investment in LIHTC housing had reached $3 billion annually 
(Guthrie & McQuarrie, 2005). 
 The program was renewed for several more years. In the meantime, the LIHTC had 
effectively created a constituency for its own support. While some affordable housing 
advocates criticized it for the inefficiencies of indirect subsidy and for shifting control from 
the federal government not to local communities but to the new sector of corporate 
technocrats, a group of several hundred nonprofits joined with major financial and 
development firms to lobby in its favor (Erickson, 2009). The LIHTC was made permanent 
in 1993. 
 Though they did not use the term “neoliberalism,” Guthrie and McQuarrie’s (2005) 
assessment of the LIHTC and its political history conforms closely to theories of neoliberal 
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policy and its actualization. They have argued that, despite its ability to direct investment 
into underserved geographies, the LIHTC represents not only a move towards privatization 
but a move toward corporate governance with "radical consequences for the structure of 
the welfare state" comprising a "shift in power and priorities within the social contract" (p. 
16, emphasis added). To explain this restructuring, Guthrie and McQuarrie mobilized the 
theory that "in moments of institutional change... individuals innovate based on the 
political opportunities available” (p. 20). The corporate constituency of the LIHTC found 
several such opportunities to innovate: first to create the program in order to prevent the 
complete removal of tax incentives for low-income housing production; then in the creation 
of sizeable markets for development, syndication, and compliance administration, among 
others; and finally in the financialization of the credit itself. 
 This is not to say, of course, that the LIHTC has not spurred immense production 
of housing affordable to low-income households across the United States. Erickson (2009) 
has defended the restructuring of affordable housing provision as the development of an 
agile, intelligent network of public, private, and nonprofit entities capable of leveraging an 
array of resources to deliver shelter tailored to community need. Understanding the 
neoliberal shift in U.S. housing policy does not necessitate a rejection of all its outcomes. 
However, critiques regarding the institutional framework around LIHTC housing and the 
mobility of its investment capital are of particular concern when considering its ability to 
serve as a resource for resilience in the face of changing markets and natural disaster. 
Mechanics. Though the LIHTC is a federal tax write-off, it is predominantly 
administered at the state level. Tax credits are allocated to each state in proportion to its 
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population, with a minimum allocation for states with low populations. Each state has a 
designated agency responsible for developing and administering a plan to award its credits 
to qualifying applicant projects on a competitive rather than entitlement basis. The resulting 
geographic distribution of LIHTC projects has been criticized for perpetuating poverty 
concentration and failing to serve areas with the most severe shortages (Wegmann & 
Christensen, 2016) and for perpetuating racial segregation, which led to the Supreme Court 
ruling that state plans could be challenged for disparate impact under the Fair Housing Act 
(TDHCA v. Inclusive Communities Project, 2015). Some states are now working to 
promote more progressive geographic distributions of LIHTC projects through their 
allocation plans (TDHCA, 2016a). 
The dollar amount of the tax credit for a project is calculated by determining the 
eligible basis (i.e., the total development cost minus land and other specified ineligible 
costs), multiplying the eligible basis by the percentage of the project that meets 
affordability requirements to determine the qualified basis, and adjusting for certain 
additional factors. Developers can often increase the basis for projects located in certain 
low-income or high-poverty census tracts, but some allocation plans now also offer a basis 
boost for projects located in certain high-income or low-poverty census tracts in order to 
promote poverty deconcentration (TDHCA, 2016a). In any case, the qualified basis is 
multiplied by the credit rate determined each month by the IRS to calculate the total value 
of awarded credits. The credits are then claimed over an accelerated period of 10 years. 
However, developers do not generally claim the credits themselves. Instead, credits are 
sold to intermediaries known as syndicators, who assemble interests in portfolios of many 
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projects for sale to investors. This allows investment capital to remain mobile and dilutes 
its risk despite extended compliance provisions (Guthrie & McQuarrie, 2005). 
To qualify for the LIHTC, a project must conform to one of two rent restriction 
models. In the first, at least 20 percent of all housing units in a project must be rented to 
households receiving no more than 50 percent of median family income (MFI) and must 
be priced at no more than 30 percent of that income threshold. Alternatively, at least 40 
percent of all units in the project must be rented to households receiving no more than 60 
percent of MFI and priced at no more than 30 percent of that threshold. In practice, 
however, it is often more sensible to developers to designate LIHTC projects for full low-
income occupancy rather than mixed-income occupancy, which enables income and rent 
restrictions based on the 60 percent threshold (McClure, 2000). In any case, the result is 
that LIHTC housing is targeted to low-income households, but not necessarily the lowest-
income households who might require deeper subsidies, and actual rents are likely to be 
more than 30 percent of household income because they are set as a percentage of the upper 
income limit. These restrictions originally applied for 15 years, though an additional, 
somewhat flexible 15-year period was applied to projects awarded after 1989. 
Casualty loss. Hackworth (2007) noted how even a product of neoliberal “roll-out 
policy could itself fall victim to roll-back destruction” (p. 48). Like some sort of ouroboros, 
neoliberalism devises new mechanisms that may produce new impediments to capital it 
will likely seek to consume when the opportunity arises. To investigate how neoliberal 
political or market pressures might actualize through disaster to dismantle LIHTC 
housing—or how LIHTC housing might successfully serve as a resource for resilience—
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institutional frameworks at the private, local, state, and federal level must be considered, 
especially regarding their policies and procedures concerning casualty loss, or damage or 
destruction resulting from a sudden, unexpected event such as a hurricane or flood. These 
frameworks and procedures provide an understanding of what can be expected through 
such an event, but also reveal what cannot be predicted through policy analysis alone. 
At the federal level, policy concerning the impacts of natural disaster is primarily 
the domain of the Internal Revenue Service. The consequence for failure to maintain 
LIHTC compliance is generally the recapture of previously awarded credits. According to 
the Internal Revenue Code, recapture should not occur in the event of casualty loss if the 
noncompliance is corrected “within a reasonable period.” It was later clarified in the 
Internal Revenue Procedure that the provision to avoid recapture shall apply in the event 
of noncompliance as the result of a presidentially-declared natural disaster if compliance 
is restored within 25 months of the end of the month in which the event occurred. In any 
case, casualty loss that results in noncompliance for any period of time must be reported 
on IRS Form 8823. 
In the State of Texas, the state agency responsible for awarding credits and 
monitoring project compliance during the required affordability period is the Texas 
Department of Housing and Community Affairs (TDHCA). Owners are required to file an 
Annual Owners Compliance Report with TDHCA each year, and must notify TDHCA of 
any instances of noncompliance for that year on the report. Additionally, they must submit 
a Notice of Casualty Loss for any instance of damage or destruction as the result of a natural 
disaster. Upon restoration of compliance, the owner must submit a Notice of Property 
  24
Restoration with supporting documentation to prove that compliance has been successfully 
restored. In the case of failure to restore compliance, TDHCA would administer the credit 
recapture. Local government typically has no direct role in the LIHTC compliance of 
private developments, and so it is not clear how a neoliberal city agenda might actualize in 
this context. 
It is more difficult to construct a general framework for casualty loss procedures at 
the project level due to the variety of institutional relationships that make exist between 
interested stakeholders. Owners are likely to have certain requirements imposed by lenders 
and insurers. In terms of project compliance, however, the innermost institutional 
framework depends on specific guarantees within contracts between members of the 
development partnership. Investment partners and syndicators may require a guarantee of 
the expected value of awarded credits such that the developer remains responsible for it 
even in the event of credit recapture, especially if the developer is a nonprofit organization 
(Mittereder, 2013). In the case of an owner who wishes to utilize a casualty loss event as 
an opportunity to redevelop, reposition, or sell the property, the distribution of penalties 
may be a deciding factor. 
This chapter has traced the neoliberal turn through U.S. affordable rental housing 
policy to the development of the LIHTC and considered how neoliberalism capitalizes on 
disaster and crisis as opportunities for its actualization, posing specific challenges to low-
income residents relying on housing resources produced by the dwindling welfare state. 
Though this final section explains the expected procedures in the event of casualty loss in 
LIHTC housing, the question remains whether market or political pressures could serve to 
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dismantle it if a disaster were to create such an opportunity, and whether subsequent 
struggles would reveal resilience. The purpose of this thesis is to address, if not to fully 
ameliorate, this gap in current knowledge. 
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Chapter 2: Research Design 
 
 For this thesis, I utilized an exploratory comparative case study design. An 
exploratory approach was appropriate, as the purpose of the research was to investigate the 
nature of a potential problem that was not yet understood, and enabled the study to shift in 
response to new discoveries. A case study offered the opportunity to explore the problem 
at greater depth in a specific historical geography. As discussed in the previous chapter, 
individual cities are sites of unique articulations of neoliberalism. A comparative approach 
was especially useful as the results of background research helped to guide the 
development of the primary research and illuminate its findings. Taken together, this 
approach called for a mix of methods and sources throughout the course of the study, which 
are described in detail later this chapter. 
The City of Galveston is located on Galveston Island (with Pelican Island also 
within city limits), a barrier island along the Texas coast of the Gulf of Mexico, 
approximately 50 miles southeast of Houston. According to the U.S. Census, its population 
was about 54,000 by 2007, dropping to less than 48,000 after Hurricane Ike. As of 2010, 
the population was about 45% white (non-Hispanic), 19% African American (non-
Hispanic), and 31% Hispanic (of any race), similar to pre-storm figures.  Due to its coastal 
location and the location of the Port of Galveston and the University of Texas Medical 
Branch there, the economy of Galveston is largely based on shipping, healthcare, and 
tourism. Of course, its location also exposes it to the hurricane risks shared by communities 
throughout the Gulf Coast region; the distribution of vulnerabilities within the city is 
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explored later in this paper. Galveston was selected due to a high-profile struggle over the 
demolition and reconstruction of traditional public housing following the hurricane, a 
process that remains incomplete as of this writing. It was hoped that this struggle would 
serve as an illuminating backdrop and a point of comparison for the examination of LIHTC 
housing in the same historical geography, suggesting how features of neoliberalism 
identified in the literature were manifest in the local context. 
 
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
The first step in designing this research was to formulate the overarching questions 
that might lead toward an understanding of affordable housing disaster resilience. As the 
most significant U.S. low-income housing production subsidy in the neoliberal era, does 
the LIHTC produce disaster resilient affordable housing, or does it serve as the ideal-type 
neoliberal policy, pairing private incentives with weak enforcement of public obligations 
for maximum capital mobility and profit?  Upon what might this be contingent? Can 
neoliberal affordable housing models be relied upon for this purpose? How might this help 
to articulate constructs of disaster resilience, especially as it relates to affordable housing 
in the neoliberal context? Does this context challenge the usefulness of the construct of 
resilience?  
These were challenging questions and any answers I might have offered were 
expected to push the limitations of this research. I did not expect to be able to offer an 
unqualified, categorical designation of LIHTC resilience to natural disaster or its use as 
opportunity for neoliberal actualization, even if the material outcomes found might have 
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otherwise suggested it. If the institutional framework around the LIHTC may have served 
to avoid some of the vulnerabilities of other housing models, I hypothesized that it would 
only have done so as it continued to perform for financially interested parties. 
Alternatively, a finding that LIHTC casualty loss policy and its enforcement was 
insufficient to support the resilience of its residential communities might have been more 
categorically damning. Though I did not anticipate being able to answer all of my questions 
conclusively, I hoped to develop further questions in the process. 
In an attempt to pursue as much of the complexity of these issues as possible within 
the very limited scope of this project, it was necessary to answer a number of specific 
questions about the selected case. 
 What was the stock of LIHTC housing in Galveston when Hurricane Ike made 
landfall? 
 What vulnerabilities did LIHTC housing and its residents face in Galveston 
through Hurricane Ike, and how might these vulnerabilities have been produced? 
Consideration of vulnerabilities, their production, and their actualization is essential for 
understanding the struggles for resilience that follow. Geographies of physical exposure 
risk to storm impacts and their production through topography, public investment, and real 
estate markets reveal how natural disaster is co-produced through human systems. 
Indicators of social vulnerability for residents suggest how communities are positioned to 
face challenges brought on by disaster that may inform how they struggle for resilience. 
Political and economic pressures within governance constitute vulnerabilities that threaten 
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futures if actualized and shape the institutional space within which such struggle may take 
place. 
Some of the vulnerabilities to public housing and its residents in Galveston were 
hypothesized to be present for LIHTC housing as well. Specifically, I anticipated that 
market conditions may have promoted the location of LIHTC housing in similar 
geographies as traditional public housing, and residents may have faced similar social 
vulnerabilities due to the demographic characteristics of resident and neighborhood 
populations. LIHTC housing, however, was not expected to face the same level of external 
political and economic pressure due to its private ownership and lack of accountability to 
the local public. Instead, I hypothesized that LIHTC housing may face a sort of internal 
vulnerability if high maintenance costs or profitable repositioning opportunities put the 
financial interests of its owners, investors, and debtors in conflict with its resilience. 
  What was the institutional framework in place around LIHTC housing in 
Galveston, and how did the interests of the constituent stakeholders of these frameworks 
relate to one another? Institutional frameworks describe the structure of relationships 
between public, private, and nonprofit entities and their responsibilities for or interests in 
LIHTC housing, including flows of capital, debt, and any obligations attached. Institutional 
frameworks also include all relevant laws, public policies, and internal procedures that may 
dictate the behavior of any or all of these entities. In the case of LIHTC housing through 
disaster, the essential question is whether the interests of any party within the institutional 
framework was in contradiction with the resilience of LIHTC housing—or, rather, the 
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function of LIHTC housing as a resource for resilience—and whether the institutional 
framework itself enables its actualization through disaster.  
 Chapter 1 explains much of what would be expected regarding the institutional 
framework around LIHTC housing, including the general structure of relationships 
between developers, syndicators, investors, the state housing agency, and the IRS, as well 
as the federal policies and state agency procedures for managing casualty loss resulting 
from natural disaster. However, the actual interests and behavior of these entities, the 
performance of their relationships, and the actualization of the relevant policies and 
procedures are context-dependent and cannot be predicted from the literature alone. Private 
stakeholders whose interests are primarily financial may support or oppose resilience 
depending on their calculation of market conditions in the specific historical geography—
in other words, whether the cost of credit recapture is less than either the cost of compliance 
or the benefits of somehow repositioning their investment. The leverage of these financial 
interests may depend on the specific provisions of contracts and guarantees between them. 
Mission-driven nonprofit developers may remain committed to resilience even if it directly 
conflicts with the interests of their for-profit investment partners. Uniformity of interests 
among public agencies cannot be assumed, either, as seen in the case of public housing in 
Galveston. Further, new institutional frameworks—such as the one represented in the 
Conciliation Agreement between public housing advocates and the State of Texas—may 
be constructed through struggle between stakeholders over time. 
  What were the initial material impacts of Hurricane Ike on LIHTC housing in 
Galveston? This includes both physical damage to or destruction of buildings as well as 
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resident evacuation and return or displacement. How did these impacts correspond to the 
vulnerabilities identified? Alternatively, was actualization of vulnerabilities in the form of 
significant storm impacts somehow resisted? 
 To date, has any damaged or destroyed LIHTC housing been repaired or rebuilt? 
How was this financed? Has compliance with income and affordability requirements been 
maintained or restored? Have displaced residents returned? If short term displacement 
occurred, how did the timeline of reconstruction relate to the ability of former residents to 
return and avoid permanent displacement? Findings of completed physical reconstruction, 
maintained regulatory compliance, and minimal residential displacement would not have 
been sufficient to capture constructs of resilience defined by recursive processes of struggle 
over community and systemic futures. However, these geographic, historical, and material 
outcomes remained indispensable for building such a narrative. I did not attempt to develop 
a hypothesis for such specific questions, though I generally expected that a lengthy period 
of reconstruction would coincide with a lower rate of resident return. 
 What struggles for the resilience of LIHTC housing occurred, and what did they 
produce? Does the narrative of LIHTC housing in Galveston through Hurricane Ike 
resemble that of public housing there? Although it would have been difficult to construct 
a detailed hypothesis for this question, I expected that the narratives of LIHTC and public 
housing would diverge significantly given the differences in vulnerabilities and 
institutional frameworks considered. Struggle over public housing occurred between 
multiple state agencies, with instrumental involvement by advocates outside its normal 
institutional framework; struggle over LIHTC housing was expected to occur between 
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multiple private entities, between the general partner and the state agency, or perhaps not 
at all. 
 
Sources and Methodology 
 My primary research objectives were to identify LIHTC housing in Galveston; to 
consider possible indicators of vulnerabilities there; to learn the material impacts of 
Hurricane Ike on LIHTC housing; to understand the institutional frameworks around 
impacted projects; to construct a history of casualty loss processes; to look for evidence of 
struggles for resilience; and to assess outcomes to date. This required the synthesis of 
datasets and documentation from a variety of local, state, and federal entities, as well as 
secondary reports from local news and advocacy sources. Many of these were identified at 
the beginning of the research process based on what was already known about the LIHTC 
and the City of Galveston. Others, such as those obtained from TDHCA through requests 
for information, were identified over the course of several correspondences with agency 
representatives as the availability of specific documentation was revealed. This section 
outlines the methods used to collect, analyze, and interpret these data. 
I began by performing a query through the HUDUser LIHTC Database to identify 
all LIHTC-awarded projects in the City of Galveston. The results of this query included 
basic data for each project: project name and address, owner information, number of 
income-restricted and market-rate units, year the project was placed in service, whether it 
was a new construction or acquisition-rehabilitation project, and several fields regarding 
additional sources of finance that were, unfortunately, listed as "not indicated" or "not 
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available" for most entries. The query produced entries for all projects ever to be awarded 
LIHTCs, so further research was necessary to determine which of these projects had still 
been in service when Hurricane Ike made landfall in Galveston. 
 Next, I downloaded the Housing Tax Credit Property Inventory spreadsheet for the 
State of Texas available on the TDHCA website and sorted for the City of Galveston. The 
spreadsheet did not provide any useful data not present in the HUDUser query results, but 
showed which of the projects listed in the HUDUser query results were still in service as 
of the most recent inventory update in 2016. Projects that were awarded before Hurricane 
Ike and were listed in the inventory were, therefore, in service through the storm. However, 
further research was still needed to determine if any projects had been in service at the time 
of the storm but were taken out of service sometime after. 
 I submitted a request for information to TDHCA under the Public Information Act, 
Texas Government Code Chapter 552. I requested records of casualty loss for all LIHTC 
projects located in the City of Galveston, including casualty loss date and corrected date, 
if the loss was ultimately corrected. I also requested records of any LIHTC projects that 
had been in service on the date that Hurricane Ike made landfall in Galveston and were 
taken out of service before the most recent inventory update. In response, a representative 
of TDHCA provided me with a spreadsheet showing the requested casualty loss records 
and dates, and a written explanation of LIHTC projects in Galveston that were no longer 
in service. 
At this point, I had determined LIHTC projects were of concern for the remainder 
of the research. I examined the basic data obtained on these projects so far, identified their 
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geographic locations and compared them to spatial distributions of social vulnerability and 
storm exposure derived from secondary sources, and compared casualty loss and 
restoration dates to federal requirements. I noted project names, addresses, and owner 
information for use in later queries. 
 I then submitted another request for information to TDHCA, this time asking for 
copies of specific documentation for LIHTC projects in Galveston that had filed for 
casualty loss after Hurricane Ike, including Notice of Casualty Loss, Notice of Property 
Restoration, and Annual Owner's Compliance Reports and IRS Form 8823 for several 
years before and after the storm. In response, a representative of TDHCA provided me with 
all of the requested documents except for IRS Form 8823, with a written explanation of 
why this document was not available. The Annual Owner's Compliance Reports comprised 
several separate documents for each year, including the Certification Report, Unit Status 
Report, and Owner's Financial Report. The representative also provided me with copies of 
letters between TDHCA and LIHTC project owners that concerned casualty loss 
procedures. 
These documents comprised the most substantial dataset for constructing a 
narrative of storm impacts and processes of casualty loss and restoration. I reviewed each 
document for each year in full and coded for material history. I analyzed financial 
performance using Owner’s Financial Reports from several years before and after the 
storm, which provided a detailed breakdown of income and expenses for each year. In one 
such report, an insurance settlement used to fund repairs was reported as income in the 
form of a "gain on involuntary conversion of rental buildings and related assets," but 
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payment for these repairs was not reported there. Assuming that the settlement was indeed 
used to fund repairs, I subtracted the settlement amount from potential and gross annual 
income, net operating income, and net cash flow, in order to more accurately analyze these 
figures across several years. All amounts were converted to 2010 U.S. dollars for purposes 
of comparison, though they appear as nominal figures when discussed in Chapter 4. 
I developed a crude estimate of resident return using pre- and post-storm Unit Status 
Reports, which listed each household by unit number, last name, household size, and dates 
of occupancy and vacancy. I assumed that some households may have returned in full, in 
part, or with additional household members. I was unable to determine whether households 
with common last names were related, but assumed that related households may have been 
assigned to a greater or fewer number of apartments based on post-storm need and 
availability. Out of necessity, I assumed that last names did not change. I aggregated 
households by last name, compared pre- and post-storm aggregate household sizes for each 
last name, and selected the lower figure as the number of residents to have returned. For 
example, if three residents with a particular last name had evacuated and two had returned, 
I would have considered two pre-storm residents to have returned and the third to have 
been displaced; if two residents with that last name had evacuated and three had returned, 
I would have considered two pre-storm residents to have returned and the third to be a new 
resident. The rate of resident return was then calculated as the total number of returned 
residents as a percentage of the pre-storm resident population. 
For additional data, I performed a query through the property search website of the 
Galveston Central Appraisal District by entering the addresses of specific LIHTC projects. 
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The results included current owner information, value assessment histories, and the dates 
of recent sales. I also performed queries through the general search function of the TDHCA 
website. The results of searching by address included LIHTC Application Log spreadsheets 
showing basic project and owner information as well as the type and amount of tax credits 
requested for each project. The results of searching by project name included Housing Tax 
Credit Program Ownership Transfer spreadsheets showing TDHCA administrative 
approval dates, types, and transferring parties of sales and other transfers of LIHTC 
projects. Finally, I performed queries by both project name and address through the Agenda 
Center search function of the City of Galveston website. The results included Galveston 
City Council meeting minutes from several meetings at which the projects were discussed 
and one City Council resolution. 
In an effort to triangulate my findings, I also consulted several secondary sources. 
I identified the primary local newspaper, the Galveston County Daily News, and performed 
a series of queries through the search function of its website as an online subscriber. Search 
terms included LIHTC project names and addresses as well as general keywords and 
phrases such as “LIHTC” and “tax credit.” Results included both news articles and editorial 
content, which I culled by relevance.  I examined relevant articles in full and coded for 
material, political, and legal history, using references or hyperlinks within articles to access 
further documentation whenever they appeared. 
Initially, this final research phase was only intended to produce secondary material 
to supplement the historical narrative I had constructed through primary research. 
Ultimately, however, another use for this material emerged. Editorial content, as well as 
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quotations from local political leaders and housing professionals, revealed local 
articulations of the kind of neoliberal discourse discussed in some of the literature 
considered in Chapter 1 of this thesis. I re-examined each article in full, this time coding 
for elements of discourse, and organized these results thematically. While I do not claim 
to have conducted a rigorous discourse analysis, I do believe that the findings of this 
examination serve to locate histories of both public and LIHTC housing in Galveston 
within broader conversations about place-based subsidized housing and the actualization 
of political and economic pressures to dismantle it. 
 
Implications, Validity, and Limitations 
 To the extent that the sources and methodology described above can provide valid 
answers to the research questions articulated before them, this research may be of some 
significance in at least two ways. First, it addresses, though it does not fully ameliorate, a 
gap in scholarly research and knowledge that further research can continue to address. A 
robust body of literature exists concerning neoliberal transformations in American housing 
policy and the use of crisis and disaster as opportunities for the actualization of neoliberal 
agendas, both broadly and in particular historical geographies. Much of this literature is 
focused on these processes as they have applied to the dismantling of traditional public 
housing and to the displacement of low-income and other vulnerable populations who 
obtain their housing on the private market. Since its creation, the low-income housing tax 
credit has become the most significant federal subsidy for the private production of 
affordable low-income housing in the United States, but it does not appear that much is 
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known about the resilience of LIHTC housing and its residents to market and neoliberal 
political pressures actualized through natural disaster.  
Second, this research articulates contradictions and complications within 
commonly touted constructs of affordable housing and disaster resilience that 
policymakers, planners, and advocates must recognize in order to work conscientiously 
toward meaningful goals. The intent of this research is not to definitively conclude whether 
or not the LIHTC produces disaster resilient affordable housing or, more accurately, 
provides affordable housing that can be a source of resilience for its residents in times of 
disaster and struggle. Due to the contingent nature of neoliberal actualization, findings 
specific to LIHTC housing in Galveston through Hurricane Ike cannot lead to such 
categorical conclusions in either case. However, if the LIHTC is to remain among the 
primary tools for the development of affordable low-income housing in the United States, 
its potential to produce sites of vulnerability or resilience to natural disasters, market 
conditions, and political pressure must be fully understood. 
 I argue that this research is internally valid. The research questions were explicit 
and covered a wide range of conditions, processes, and outcomes. The main constructs 
considered were carefully articulated and care was taken not to oversimplify their 
operationalization. Data were collected from a variety of sources, though the validity of the 
data itself relies on the accuracy of government records. Where analytic methods were 
problematic, such as in the estimate of resident rate of return, the findings are presented 
with appropriate caution. The most significant limitation to this research is that no 
interviews were conducted with LIHTC project owners, investors, or residents. Such 
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interviews were planned if the initial phases of research had pointed to the occurrence of 
particular types of struggle. Nonetheless, it must be acknowledged that the picture remains 
incomplete without these perspectives. 
As a case study in a single geography, the research is subject to typical limitations 
to external validity. That is, the findings from this particular case cannot necessarily be 
generalized to other LIHTC projects in other historical geographies. In fact, the purpose of 
this thesis is not to seek a generalizable model, but rather to investigate how the general 
LIHTC framework functions in the particular case. This fits into the assertion discussed in 
the literature review that the actualization of neoliberalism is contingent and opportunistic 
rather than systematic. Regardless of the specific outcomes of this case, it is the potential 
for LIHTC housing to serve as a site of vulnerability and neoliberal actualization that 
carries the most compelling implication of this thesis. 
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Chapter 3: Background 
 
Barely one month after Hurricane Ike made landfall on Galveston Island, leading 
to the destruction of more than half of the city’s public housing, a local advocate warned 
that reconstruction of those units would be threatened by local development interests and 
a government looking to cut costs (Henneberger, 2008a). Today, after nearly eight years of 
analysis, debate, and the mobilization of political will, progress toward full restoration of 
Galveston’s pre-storm public housing stock has been made, but it is far from complete. 
This chapter is intended to reveal the process by which fair and affordable housing 
advocates confronted a resourceful coalition of opponents who aimed to capitalize on the 
storm and banish the community’s most vulnerable residents once and for all. This history 
is one articulation of the actualization of neoliberalism through natural disaster and the 
struggle for resilience against it, and serves as a useful comparative case for the inquiries 
of this thesis. 
 
Public Housing in Galveston Through Hurricane Ike 
Census estimates (2007) suggest some of the housing affordability issues already 
faced by Galveston residents before the storm. Both median home value and median 
monthly homeowner costs were 17% less in Galveston than they were for the Houston 
metropolitan region in which it is contained, and the median rent was 6% less. However, 
only 43% of Galveston households owned their homes, compared to 64% across the region.  
Despite the relatively low cost of housing, the percentage of Galveston residents paying 
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more than 30% of income on housing costs—an imperfect but common measure of 
affordability—was similar to that of the region: nearly half of Galveston renters were 
burdened with high housing costs compared to their incomes. 
Before Ike, the Galveston Housing Authority (GHA) operated more than 900 units 
of public housing in four apartment complexes, two high-rises, 10 duplexes, and 25 other 
scattered-site units. All four apartment complexes were located north of Broadway Avenue, 
from as far east as 16th Street to as far west as 52nd Street (see Map 1, next page). 
Demographic maps consistently show this area with lower incomes, higher unemployment 
and poverty rates, and a greater proportion of renters and minority residents than most other 
parts of Galveston (Wild, 2009; Powell, 2013). This is also one of the most physically 
vulnerable parts of Galveston. Broadway Avenue, elevated after the “Great Storm” of 
1900, serves as both an “environmental and socioeconomic dividing line” (Wild, 2009). 
Areas south of Broadway and east of 61st Street are protected by a 17-foot seawall to the 
south, while the elevated roadway prevents floodwaters from entering through Galveston 
Bay. While most of Galveston is vulnerable to even a Category 1 hurricane, this protected 
area is vulnerable to hurricanes Category 2 or greater (Wild, 2009). 
Galveston was almost completely evacuated in time for the storm, which hit the 
city as a Category 2 hurricane on September 13, 2008. Much of the island was under eight 
feet of water, and high-water marks of 14 feet from the bay-side storm surge were reported 
(Wild, 2009). A series of maps drafted by the city several months later show that the 
greatest concentration of building permit applications “put on hold” due to the magnitude  
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Map 1: Major Public Housing Sites in Galveston, TX, as of September 12, 2008 
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of damage were located north of Broadway Avenue, except toward the eastern end of the 
island where many parcels received exemptions for historic status and were allowed to 
rebuild immediately (Wild, 2009).  
Of course, it is not necessary to cite an engineering text to assert that delayed 
reconstruction is likely to expose structures to further damage as wind and rain continue to 
penetrate them, and this is precisely what was observed in the four public housing 
complexes above Broadway (Henneberger, 2008b). Ultimately, these four complexes, 
totaling 569 units, were condemned for demolition. Former residents were eligible for a 
number of temporary housing programs administered by GHA, but no immediate 
commitment was made to provide these residents with new units on the island before the 
scope of relief funding was revealed. 
The most recent census estimates (2014) portrayed a city that still had yet to fully 
recover. While the overall housing stock was reduced by only 1% over pre-storm figures, 
the number of occupied housing units fell by over 3,000, or 14%. The majority of this 
reduction was attributed to rental households, arguably evidence of differences in 
vulnerability between owners and renters in Galveston that post-disaster assistance 
programs were unable to offset. Oakley and Ruel (2011) reported that many vacant rental 
units remained uninhabitable, and that the tightening market had driven a rent increase of 
13% since Hurricane Ike. Van Zandt et al. (2012) have used pre- and post-storm social 
vulnerability mapping to show how existing housing inequalities have been exacerbated 
through the recovery process in Galveston. 
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The Struggle for Resilience 
Six months after the storm, 70% of Galveston residents had returned home (Wild, 
2009), and pressure had begun to build for GHA to provide housing for their residents to 
return to as well. On March 2, 2009, the nonprofit law firm Lone Star Legal Aid (LSLA) 
filed an administrative complaint with the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD) attempting to block GHA’s demolition of its damaged public housing 
developments despite reports that the sites posed a danger in their current condition 
(Henneberger, 2008b). LSLA and GHA reached a settlement on March 13, withdrawing 
LSLA’s complaint and allowing demolition to proceed in exchange for a commitment by 
GHA for one-for-one replacement of all public housing units (GHA & LSLA, 2009). 
GHA executive director Harish Krishnarao began to perceive community 
opposition to the utilization of relief funds for public housing reconstruction after an online 
petition circulated referring to public housing residents as “parasites” and equating 
reconstruction with the creation of a “welfare paradise” to “[cater] to their lifestyles” 
(Wilder, 2012). Race- and class-tinged language was increasingly heard at public meetings. 
Nonetheless, Krishnarao confirmed his “obligation to the community and... agreement with 
Lone Star Legal Aid” at a May 1 board meeting (quoted in Wild, 2009). 
Meanwhile, FEMA had worked with the city to create Galveston’s Long-Term 
Community Recovery Plan (2009). Henneberger (2009c) concluded that the plan would 
serve to “use disaster recovery funds to reshape the community socially and economically 
into a city that would be profoundly different than the one that existed before Hurricane 
Ike.” In addition to several recommended strategies to speed reconstruction of privately-
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owned housing, the plan proposed a single initiative for public housing reconstruction 
whereby GHA would partner with the Galveston Historical Foundation to redevelop 
scattered site units. This item included little discussion of feasibility, cost-effectiveness, or 
the capacity of this initiative to sufficiently fulfill reconstruction needs. 
Congressional appropriations for Hurricane Ike recovery funds came through HUD 
as supplemental Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) funds, of which $3.1 
billion were allocated to the State of Texas (HUD, 2010). The first $1.3 billion of this sum 
was then allocated to local councils of government (COGs) by the Texas Department of 
Rural Affairs (TDRA). Doubts had already been raised about the administrative capacity 
of many of the 18 COGs in affected areas based on their track record after Hurricane Rita 
in 2005 (Henneberger, 2008c). That program was significantly smaller, at $40 million, and 
was originally intended to assist nearly 1,500 households with repairs and reconstruction. 
Its scope was eventually downsized to just 430 units, of which only 11 site-built and 59 
mobile homes had been completed in the entire jurisdiction of the Houston-Galveston COG 
by the end of 2008. 
After Rita, COGs had been required to spend at least 55% of their recovery funds 
for housing reconstruction, and this later was later raised to 75% in order to meet ongoing 
need (Henneberger, 2009d). When the first round of Hurricane Ike funds were delivered, 
COGs were allowed to determine how much they would spend on housing reconstruction 
and how much they would spend for other purposes, such as the development of new 
infrastructure. Estimates had indicated that half a billion dollars would be needed for Texas 
to rebuild housing for the low-income population alone (Henneberger, 2009a), but the 
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COGs, taken together, chose to spend 48% of first-round funds on all housing programs 
combined. The City of Galveston had voluntarily allocated 60% of its first-round funding 
on a variety of housing programs, including $25 million for public housing reconstruction, 
though this would not cover the cost of complete one-for-one replacement (Henneberger, 
2009b). 
Opposition to this scheme materialized when the State of Texas applied in 
September, 2009, to spend the remaining $1.7 billion it had been allocated. This second-
round proposal, like the first, did not include requirements above the 11% Congressional 
minimum for housing expenditures. Further, funds were geographically allocated 
according to recorded meteorological data such as wind speed and rainfall rather than 
according to reported damages (Henneberger, 2009e). This would have resulted in 
disproportionately low allocation per damaged home in the Houston-Galveston area and a 
disproportionately high allocation in areas of the state that were less severely affected 
(Sloan & Fowler, 2015). 
Texas Low Income Housing Information Services (TxLIHIS), a research and policy 
development organization based in Austin, and Texas Appleseed, a public interest justice 
organization and part of the national Appleseed network, lodged a formal complaint with 
HUD on October 28, 2009, alleging that the Texas allocation scheme violated several 
sections of the Fair Housing Act (HUD, 2010). Two weeks later, HUD rejected the 
allocation scheme for incompleteness, having failed to justify the criteria by which it had 
determined funding for local recipients (Marquez, 2009a). Additionally, HUD was 
displeased that the State had attempted to fulfill its obligation to affirmatively further fair 
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housing by submitting documentation dating back to 2003. HUD followed up the next 
month with a letter that included a map of Texas Gulf Coast counties showing the 
discrepancies between proposed allocations and HUD’s assessments of unmet need 
(Marquez, 2009b). Specifically, the map showed that Galveston County had been allocated 
less than half of its assessed need, while 22 counties had been allocated funds despite no 
measurable unmet need whatsoever. 
The State was given until February 10, 2010, to revise its submission, but it was 
not until April 9 that a Conciliation Agreement outlining new allocation terms was signed 
by HUD, the State of Texas, and complainants TxLIHIS and Texas Appleseed. The 
Agreement (HUD, 2010) required the State to conduct an up-to-date analysis of potential 
impediments to fair housing in Texas and to provide ongoing reports of program 
beneficiaries to show that it is affirmatively furthering fair housing. It then specified how 
certain portions of CDBG funds must be spent: 55% on all housing programs, with an 
overlapping 55% on all programs benefiting low and moderate income people. Notably, 
these requirements apply to the entire $3.1 billion CDBG appropriation, not just the 
second-round funding that had been denied. 
The Agreement also provided set-asides for a range of specific programs. Not least 
of these was the one-for-one replacement of all 569 units of public housing destroyed by 
Hurricane Ike in Galveston. A base amount of $50 million was set aside, but other funds 
could also be available for this purpose until complete replacement was achieved. The 
GHA had committed to this effort a full year before, but sufficient funding to follow 
through had finally been assured. With memory of the post-Katrina failures of FEMA 
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undoubtedly still fresh in the mind of observers, HUD was praised for doing “the right 
thing” in forcing accountability in Texas disaster spending (Henneberger, 2010). However, 
there were still several more battles ahead. 
One year after the Conciliation Agreement was signed, the GHA missed its deadline 
to produce site plans for most of its new units and requested a 12-month extension 
(Henneberger, 2011a). John Henneberger of TxLIHIS testified to the Texas Department of 
Housing and Community Affairs (TDHCA) that the GHA had begun to planning to develop 
its new public housing within mixed-income developments that would include both 
subsidized and market-rate units. Henneberger raised concerns about whether this could be 
achieved within the budget allocated for reconstruction without sacrificing benefits to low-
income residents, and urged the agency not to grant an extension of more than six months 
for the site plans. 
Then, on June 13, 2011, GHA Executive Director Krishnarao resigned over a 
“difference of philosophy” with the board “with regard to the direction and future of 
ongoing redevelopment,” according to his own statement (Henneberger, 2011b). 
Krishnarao had reportedly received intense criticism from both pro-public housing 
advocates who wanted faster progress and from anti-public housing activists who did not 
want to see any reconstruction at all—including some within the leadership of the GHA 
itself. 
That Friday, Governor Perry announced that the Texas General Land Office (GLO) 
would take over from TDRA and TDHCA as the agency responsible for administering 
disaster recovery funds (Henneberger, 2011c). It seems that public housing advocates had 
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gained an ally in the process, as GLO Commissioner Jerry Patterson would go on to express 
his commitment to enforcement of the Conciliation Agreement and threaten that the City 
of Galveston could forfeit all its CDBG funds should it remain non-compliant 
(Henneberger, 2013). 
July 15, 2011, was the grand opening of Oaks IV, the first public housing 
reconstruction in Galveston since Hurricane Ike. Located on the former site of the 104-unit 
Palm Terrace development Oaks IV contained just 40 units in 20 duplex structures. All 
units were designated for low-income households, and displaced GHA residents had first 
priority to lease them. Unfortunately, this was only cause for celebration for a fraction of 
displaced residents, the rest of whom would have to keep waiting as GHA continued to 
perfect its mixed-income development plans rather than expedite the one-for-one 
replacement of the remaining 529 lost units. 
Galveston adopted a new Comprehensive Plan on October 27, 2011, in which only 
brief mention was made of the issue of public housing loss and replacement. Though 
overall housing affordability, especially for middle-income working families, was 
presented as a goal, the plan did little more than recommend that the city pursue initiatives 
presented in the Long-Term Community Recovery Plan. Further, its disaster planning 
chapter made no mention of the well-documented differences in vulnerability across 
Galveston and its population, compromising its potential to contribute to equitable 
resilience to future storms. 
The following year brought continued instability within the leadership of the GHA. 
Stanley Lowe was brought on as Executive Director in March, 2012 (GHA, 2012a). At that 
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time, Joe Jaworski was the Mayor of Galveston and Betty Massey was the GHA 
Chairperson. Retired local businessman Lewis Rosen was elected Mayor on May 12, and 
the GHA board was reportedly already negotiating Lowe’s severance package by June 26 
in anticipation of his removal by the new Board of Directors that would be appointed by 
Rosen (Smith, 2012b). Irwin “Buddy” Herz was appointed GHA Chairperson by the new 
board. 
Herz outlined his perspective in a guest column published in the local newspaper 
that July, calling the GHA administration of tenant-based housing vouchers a “model 
program for our nation,” conveying the familiar neoliberal argument that vouchers 
provided residents with freedom of choice in the local housing market in the face of 
concentrated poverty, and arguing that vouchers should satisfy the purpose of the 
Conciliation Agreement and negate the necessity for physical reconstruction of public 
housing (Herz, 2012). Though Herz argued that this would save taxpayer money, the GHA 
had already spent as much as $1.6 million toward its plans and that just the cost of getting 
out of its contract with the developer without following through with the reconstruction 
could have been another $1.5 million (Taylor, 2012b). 
The GHA board only intended to keep Lowe in his position until September 30, but 
Herz threatened his own resignation out of frustration with Lowe on August 23, saying 
Lowe wished to return displaced low-income residents to a “ghetto” because he supported 
the reconstruction of public housing that the Conciliation Agreement mandated 
(Dietrichson, 2012). At the urging of his allies on the board, Herz ultimately rescinded his 
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resignation and agreed to stay on as chairperson, while Lowe resigned just four days later 
(Smith, 2012b). 
Despite the upheaval, GHA only missed its final deadline to present its 
reconstruction plans to HUD by two days, and was able to avoid—or at least forestall—
complete loss of all disaster recovery funding to the City of Galveston (Smith, 2012c). The 
reconstruction plan (GHA, 2012b) provided for 141 public housing units to be constructed 
within two mixed-income developments on the former sites of Cedar Terrace and Magnolia 
Homes and 388 units to be constructed on scattered sites. All units would be protected with 
a 75-year land use restriction agreement, but the scattered site units would be owned and 
operated by one or more non-profit organizations contracted by the GLO rather than GHA 
itself. Some single-family units would be eligible for purchase through a multi-agency 
homeownership program, but these would be replaced with additional rental units before 
sale. Up to 50 of the scattered-site units could be constructed in mainland Galveston 
County. 
In the year following Hurricane Ike, Galveston resident and investor David 
Stanowski had become frustrated with the slow pace of recovery and what he perceived as 
a lack of citizen oversight of local government. On August 27, 2009, Stanowski proposed 
the creation of a “watchdog” organization he named the Galveston Open Government 
Project (GOGP) in an article he released online (Stanowski, 2009). Although the original 
proposal made no mention of public housing, it soon became the organization’s 
centerpiece. 
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Leading up to the May 2012 mayoral and city council elections, GOGP had 
solicited responses from each candidate to questions about their position on the 
reconstruction and published them on its website (GOGP, 2012). Five of the six winning 
council candidates and the new mayor had responded that they would not support the 
enforcement of the Conciliation Agreement. Most called for a voucher approach over on-
site public housing, even though the city already had more than 1,200 Section 8 vouchers 
in use before Hurricane Ike and was appropriated more than 300 additional vouchers as 
part of recovery funding. Several suggested that GHA could comply with the Conciliation 
Agreement by constructing traditional units in mainland Galveston County. Either way, the 
implication was that everyone would be better off if public housing residents did not return 
to Galveston. 
Despite the success of the anti-housing slate, most were unwilling to risk the threat 
of complete funding loss for the city, and the new city council voted 5-2 in favor of the 
reconstruction plan on September 28, 2012 (White, 2013). The GLO objected to 
contingency language within the resolution that may have compromised the 
implementation of the plan and froze Galveston’s road, water, and wastewater 
infrastructure funding on April 10, 2013, until the language was removed by another 5-2 
city council vote on April 17. Several other concerns were subsequently negotiated with 
the GLO. 
On December 3, GOGP and three local individuals filed a class-action lawsuit 
against GHA, the City of Galveston, the GLO, and HUD claiming that the reconstruction 
plan violated the Fair Housing Act by “[denying] public housing residents admission to 
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non-impoverished, integrated neighborhoods” (GOGP v. HUD, 2013). The plaintiffs 
argued that rebuilding public housing on the same sites on which the demolished 
complexes had been located would concentrate low-income residents in areas of poverty 
and low opportunity. Further, GOGP argued that the entire City of Galveston is an area of 
concentrated poverty, and that precedent cases such as Thompson v. HUD suggest GHA 
should site housing in high-opportunity areas across a wider housing market, including the 
mainland. To this end, GOGP requested a preliminary injunction against any further public 
housing construction in Galveston. 
Ultimately, a preliminary injunction was not granted, but the lawsuit did cause 
complication as GHA attempted to push through with development. In a February 2014 
meeting of the Board of Directors, GHA Chairperson Herz reported that the State Attorney 
General had refused to approve a $15 million bond issue from the City of Galveston for 
the mixed-income housing developments until the lawsuit had been settled (GHA, 2014b). 
Despite Herz’s reiteration that the city had been “bullied” into accepting a reconstruction 
plan “crammed down” from the state and federal agencies, he expressed his commitment 
to move forward in the interest of the city. The GHA immediately began to negotiate with 
the GLO and HUD for a loan to cover the $15 million financing gap created when the bond 
issue was withheld (Rice, 2014). 
On April 30, 2014, a federal district court judge dismissed all but one plaintiff from 
the lawsuit for lack of standing, including GOGP itself (Ferguson, 2014). The judge told 
GOGP that the decision to proceed with reconstruction had been “enacted after vigorous 
public debate” and that it could not sue the government simply because it disagreed with 
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the results. GOGP filed what it called its “final” appellant’s brief on February 4, and posted 
its last entry to its website on February 22, 2015 (GOGP, 2015). There has been no apparent 
GOGP activity since. 
 
Outcomes and Takeaways 
On September 13, 2014—exactly six years after Hurricane Ike made landfall in 
Galveston—the GHA broke ground for two mixed-income developments, now called the 
Cedars at Carver Park and Villas on the Strand (GCDN, 2014). Chairman Herz spoke at 
the event, with little sentiment for the accomplishment. Herz compared the negotiations 
that led to the occasion to the surrender of Japan at the end of World War II, and repeatedly 
referred to the pro-public housing coalition as “the Austin advocates” to whom the GLO 
simply deferred, implying that the reconstruction was only occurring under duress from 
leftist outsiders given illegitimate power by the state over local affairs. He praised Mayor 
Rosen, who, though elected on an anti-public housing platform, had “put the best interests 
of this city above his political beliefs” by following through on reconstruction plans to 
avoid loss of federal funding. 
If this narrative is accepted, it appears that a key factor in the struggle over public 
housing reconstruction was the ability of advocates to gain leverage over an institutional 
framework that had been and continued to be administered by those who would dismantle 
it from within. The result, however, was an even compromise at best, with no more than 
half of the public housing units that had occupied these sites to be replaced there, and the 
remainder to be rented at market rate with no vouchers accepted. In his speech, Herz 
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asserted that the demolished projects had originally been built only “for the short term 
purpose of housing people who needed help during traumatic periods in their lives until 
they were able to restore themselves” (GCDN, 2014). In a way, this resembled Dunn’s 
(2013) construct of housing as a resource for resilience, the security of the home through 
traumatic periods enabling the colonization of one’s future and thus the self. However, in 
the neoliberal construct to which Herz actually alludes, restoration of the self is indicated 
through the virtue of participation in the private housing market, and public housing lacks 
the legitimacy required for it to serve as such a source of security. Of course, this discourse 
simply illuminated the contradictions that material history had already shown: those within 
the institutions responsible for public housing in Galveston were not only opposed to its 
restoration and resilience, but opposed to the very definition of public housing as a true 
home for its residents. 
 This chapter provides useful context for the inquiries of this thesis in several ways. 
It presents some of the vulnerabilities to affordable housing and its residents that resulted 
from interacting physical landscapes, infrastructure investments, housing markets, and 
human geographies in Galveston before Hurricane Ike. It shows how those in local 
government had been poised to exploit the storm as an opportunity to actualize the 
neoliberal political economy through the dismantling of public housing, and largely 
succeeded. Finally, it articulates the institutional frameworks that developed around public 
housing in Galveston and chronicles the struggle over its resilience. This information 
situates the literature on the actualization of neoliberalism through natural disaster within 
the local landscape and suggests how struggle over the resilience of other affordable 
  56
housing models such as the LIHTC may have been manifest within the same historical 
geography.  
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Chapter 4: Findings 
 
LIHTC Housing in Galveston Before the Storm 
Initial development. Developers in Galveston took advantage of the newly created 
LIHTC early on. According to HUD records, housing tax credits began to be awarded to 
projects in Galveston in 1987, just one year after the passage of the Tax Reform Act that 
established the program. By 1992, 15 LIHTC-leveraged projects were in service in 
Galveston, totaling 579 units, all of which were awarded based on 100% low-income 
household occupancy. The majority were acquisition-rehabilitation rather than new 
construction projects, and most had for-profit rather than non-profit sponsors. 
However, most of these projects were placed in service before the enactment of 
extended compliance requirements and expired after 15 years. These projects may have 
had additional affordability restrictions attached to other sources of funding, but were no 
longer subject to compliance monitoring by TDHCA under the LIHTC program. The only 
project subject to 30-year affordability restrictions—and thus the only project remaining in 
the program when Hurricane Ike made landfall—was Sandpiper Cove, a 192-unit 
apartment complex spanning three city blocks on the bay side of the island, built in 1971 
(see Map 2, next page). The remainder of this chapter is focused on this complex and its 
history through Hurricane Ike.  
Consideration of vulnerabilities. It is important to consider potential 
vulnerabilities at Sandpiper Cove that, when actualized through Hurricane Ike, would 
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Map 2: Active LIHTC Sites in Galveston, TX, as of September 12, 2008
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have produced the context for any struggles for resilience to follow. However, as 
previously discussed, this research faced a major limitation in this regard, as it was not an 
ethnographic inquiry into the vulnerabilities and resilience of the community of residents. 
I examined demographic characteristics of residents of LIHTC housing and surrounding 
neighborhoods only generally, and did not investigate the experiences or social networks 
of individual residents. However, it was necessary to recognize potential indicators of 
vulnerability in order to underscore the need for resources for resilience in the face of acute 
disaster in the midst of an eroding social welfare state. The question remained whether the 
LIHTC produces housing that can serve as such a resource. 
For the purposes of LIHTC eligibility, all units in Sandpiper Cove were set aside 
for households earning less than 60% of area median family income (MFI). In addition, 
Sandpiper Cove received project-based rental vouchers for all of its units, which meant that 
it could lease to residents earning even less, as HUD would pay the difference between 
30% of a household’s income and the federally-set fair market rent for its unit. The 
prevalence and patterns of voucher use within LIHTC housing is discussed further by 
Williamson et al. (2009). In any case, this enabled the ultimate residential mix present at 
Sandpiper Cove at the time of Hurricane Ike to include households with earnings 
significantly lower than 60% of area median family income, including 57 households with 
no earnings at all. Ninety-three percent of residents were non-white, and 59 individuals 
were either disabled, elderly, or both. 
Like its traditional public housing counterparts, Sandpiper Cove was located above 
what Wild (2009) described as Galveston’s “environmental and socioeconomic dividing 
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line.” This area is characterized by lower incomes, higher unemployment and poverty rates, 
and a greater proportion of renters and minority residents than most other parts of 
Galveston. As the struggle over public housing revealed, these surroundings can represent 
what Simon and Dooling (2013) call material and political vulnerabilities: the first 
produced by the potential disadvantage to residents living in concentrated poverty and 
racial segregation, and the second by the political exploitation of its "marginalizing 
influence" (p. 1413) by opponents in order to dismantle affordable housing and displace 
poor residents. 
Issues of crime and policing would become a significant part of the history of 
Sandpiper Cove in the years after Hurricane Ike, but Sandpiper Cove was already known 
as a site of struggle over these issues long before the storm (McDonald, 2008). In fact, the 
only pre-storm news search results concerning Sandpiper Cove were reports of crime and 
police crackdowns. As with related issues of poverty and segregation, this was not the focus 
of my research, but remains important to note as a potential source of vulnerabilities for 
residents and for Sandpiper Cove itself. Additionally, the presence of threats to resident 
health and safety complicates questions of affordable housing as a resource for resilience; 
it is not sufficient to consider only whether housing is affordable and whether it can 
withstand disaster. Later in this chapter, the use of crime at Sandpiper Cove as part of the 
discourse against both LIHTC housing and public housing will be discussed. 
Institutional frameworks. As shown in Chapter 3, efforts by outside opponents to 
utilize Hurricane Ike as an opportunity to dismantle public housing were not nearly as 
effective as efforts by opponents within its institutional framework. This, in turn, shaped 
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the ways in which advocates for public housing resilience organized an alternative 
institutional framework through litigation and struggle with federal and state agencies. The 
structure of institutional frameworks around LIHTC housing is quite distinct from that of 
public housing, but was expected to have been no less consequential in shaping the future 
of Sandpiper Cove. 
The first stakeholders within the institutional framework of LIHTC housing to 
consider are the private entities responsible for its development and management. As 
discussed in the literature review, while the tax credit program itself is fairly simple, it has 
spawned a complex industry in order to develop projects and transform credits into highly 
mobile capital. For Sandpiper Cove, the general development partner was Sandpiper Cove 
Apartments Limited Partnership (SCALP), the property management company was 
National Property Management, Inc., and the tax credit syndicator was the National Non 
Profit Housing Corporation, all located in Crystal Lake, Illinois. 
While these were legally three separate business entities, SCALP was actually a 
subsidiary of the property management company, and the contact person for all three of 
these companies was the same: Robert Rohlwing, listed as president, vice president, 
treasurer, and secretary of SCALP. The hypothesis presented in Chapter 2 was that this 
web of stakeholders might have contradictory interests in the event of casualty loss that 
would produce conditions for struggle. However, many of these interests were concentrated 
in a single individual. What this means for such internal contradictions is uncertain; several 
reports stated that Rohlwing had developed a reputation for refusing to communicate with 
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both media and public officials, and I did not attempt to overcome the odds against securing 
an interview myself. 
The next set of stakeholders within the institutional framework to consider are the 
public entities responsible for program administration and compliance. In Texas,the Texas 
Department of Housing and Community Affairs (TDHCA) awards LIHTC credits 
allocated to them by the federal government and monitors compliance through its 
Compliance Division. Although TDHCA does conduct field research when necessary, it 
appears that its primary compliance tool is the Annual Owners Compliance Report 
(AOCR), which must be completed and submitted for each LIHTC project by its general 
partner each year. If non-compliance is reported and is not corrected according to TDHCA 
requirements within the federally mandated timeline, TDHCA may withhold or recapture 
some portion of the credits it had awarded. 
Since the LIHTC is, after all, an outlay of tax credits rather than block grants, the 
IRS is the federal agency most likely to function as part of the institutional framework of 
LIHTC housing. Under certain circumstances, the general partner must report any instances 
of noncompliance that reduces the project’s eligible basis to the IRS on Form 8823. 
However, as discussed in Chapter 2, a TDHCA representative stated that SCALP did not 
need to file this form for noncompliance related to Hurricane Ike, and so the IRS was not 
actively involved in this case. 
Unlike the institutional framework around public housing, that of LIHTC housing 
generally does not include any local government entities. Neither the Galveston Housing 
Authority (GHA), responsible for public housing in Galveston, nor the Galveston City 
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Council, had authority over Sandpiper Cove. Hypothetically, if SCALP had sought any 
local, state, or FEMA recovery funding after Hurricane Ike, it might have provided 
whichever agency administered the funds with a degree of leverage over the future of 
Sandpiper Cove. Because they did not seek any such funds, the only interaction that 
SCALP had with the City of Galveston was to request that it provide inspection 
certifications for completed repairs so that these could be sent to TDHCA as documentation 
of corrected non-compliance. 
Sandpiper Cove also received rental vouchers, which might have incorporated it 
into yet another institutional framework characterized by other flows of funding and the 
attached obligations. However, whereas tenant-based housing vouchers are administered 
by the local housing authority and might have provided the GHA with some degree of 
leverage, Sandpiper Cove received project-based vouchers, which were administered 
directly by HUD. In fact, as discussed later in this chapter, representatives from both the 
GHA and City Council were frustrated that they seemed to lack any direct means to exert 
pressure on the operations of Sandpiper Cove. 
This framework might have spared Sandpiper Cove from local government hostility 
to affordable housing that could have been actualized through Hurricane Ike as it was for 
public housing. Conversely, this framework might have been a challenge to resilience at 
Sandpiper Cove if its owners or investors had determined that it was in their financial 
interest to accept credit recapture and either forego physical reconstruction or use 
reconstruction as an opportunity to exit the program and reposition the property to a more 
profitable market or use. If this had occurred, the only entity accountable to residents would 
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be a single, elusive corporate entity located nearly a thousand miles away. Residents who 
might have looked to struggle for the resilience of their community would have few sources 
of public leverage, and might have also lacked the political capital provided to public 
housing residents in their struggle by experienced and organized advocates. 
 
Impacts and Aftermath of Hurricane Ike 
Damage and displacement. Sandpiper Cove was located in the area of greatest 
exposure to storm surge from Galveston Bay and least protection by physical infrastructure. 
The entire complex was evacuated, and all 96 ground-floor units were flooded under four 
feet of water (Elder, 2009). High winds partially tore the roofs from nine of the 96 second-
floor units and damaged building exteriors, including gutters, railings, and landscaping 
(Rohlwing, 2009d). It was reported that one man was found dead in Sandpiper Cove 
(GCDN, 2008), but another source clarified that the man was actually found in an unrelated 
location named the Sandpiper Motel (Houston Chronicle, 2008). 
By May 28, 2009, property management had begun to accept priority applications 
for former residents who wished to return to Sandpiper Cove, giving them until June 20 to 
communicate their intent. After that date, applications from new residents would be 
accepted. Residents began to return to Sandpiper Cove on August 30, 2009, just under one 
year after the evacuation. By the end of the year, only three vacancies remained. By a very 
crude estimate (see Chapter 2), about 55% of former residents returned to Sandpiper Cove. 
Most were not assigned to the same apartments that they had previously occupied. While 
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the racial and ethnic composition of the resident population did not change drastically, only 
15 elderly or disabled residents moved into the restored development. 
 Reconstruction finance. I was particularly interested in the impacts of Hurricane 
Ike on the financial performance of Sandpiper Cove for its owners. Difficulty financing 
repairs or maintaining the bottom line through the repair process might have determined 
their willingness to remain compliant with LIHTC restrictions rather than attempt to 
reposition the property in the market. This, in turn, would have exacerbated resident 
displacement and created conditions for the community and potential advocates to struggle 
for resilience at Sandpiper Cove. 
To complete the necessary repairs, SCALP claimed an insurance settlement of over 
$3.5M (for comparison, the pre-storm assessed value of Sandpiper Cove was $3.3M). For 
2009, SCALP reported a vacancy and collection loss of $1.7M due to resident displacement 
during the repair period, out of a potential gross annual rental income of $2.1M based on 
full occupancy. However, property management, payroll, maintenance, property tax, 
utilities, and other typical expenses also decreased as Sandpiper Cove was not operating as 
an active apartment complex. SCALP also reported lower payments towards replacement 
reserves and had no interest due on notes payable in the year 2009, indicating that they did 
not take on short-term debt for maintenance or improvements as the repairs had been 
funded by the insurance settlement. However, these expenditure reductions were 
insufficient to compensate for a complete lack of rental income, resulting in a negative net 
cash flow of $1.1M for that year. 
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By the end of 2009, Sandpiper Cove was almost completely re-occupied, and 
reported operating with a positive net cash flow for 2010. This may have been aided by its 
continued receipt of project-based rental vouchers from HUD, essentially guaranteeing a 
pool of renters with a steady source of rental payment. Failing to restore LIHTC 
compliance would have been a financial risk, not only due to the consequences of credit 
recapture, but also because the success of any sort of repositioning would be contingent on 
market conditions to supply higher-paying tenants. An entirely different scenario might 
have been possible in the absence of vouchers or in the presence of a more profitable real 
estate market. 
 Compliance monitoring and enforcement. SCALP submitted its 2008 AOCR for 
Sandpiper Cove to TDHCA on April 1, 2009, in which it stated the damage and vacancy 
caused by Hurricane Ike and included the insurance settlement on its Owner’s Financial 
Report; this appears to have been the first notification of noncompliance at Sandpiper Cove 
provided to TDHCA since the storm. SCALP submitted its official Notice of Disaster and 
Casualty Loss to TDHCA on October 20, 2009—over seven weeks after residents had 
already begun to return. TDHCA responded with a letter dated December 11, stating that 
a representative from the Compliance and Asset Oversight Division had visited Sandpiper 
Cove to conduct a limited audit and found no evidence of continued noncompliance. The 
letter then stated that, according to IRS regulations, SCALP was required to submit an 
official Notice of Disaster and Property Restoration along with supporting documentation 
by the end of the second year after the casualty loss occurred—December 31, 2010—or be 
subject to penalties, including possible credit recapture. 
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SCALP submitted its Notice of Disaster and Property Restoration on April 21, 
2010, and reiterated that Sandpiper Cove had been fully restored by the end of the previous 
year. The supporting documentation required including either certificates of occupancy 
provided by the City or both photographs of all restoration work completed on affected 
buildings and units and copies of income certifications showing occupancy dates for new 
and returning residents. However, SCALP only submitted copies of income certifications 
with no restoration photographs. TDHCA responded with a letter dated May 17, restating 
the documentation requirements. SCALP replied with a letter dated May 25, claiming that 
they had already sent the required documentation, though it had not. TDHCA responded 
again on August 11, simply stating that the submission was insufficient and that they would 
not provide any further correspondence on the issue, leaving responsibility for successful 
completion of the requirements to SCALP. Finally, SCALP submitted both restoration 
photographs and certificates of occupancy to TDHCA on September 15, in the end 
providing more documentation that actually required. TDHCA provided confirmation that 
the process was complete on December 6. 
Unlike the dramatic struggle over public housing that remains incomplete to date, 
the LIHTC restoration process was relatively straightforward and occurred almost entirely 
without involvement by public entities, except to confirm that the process had, in fact, been 
completed according to regulations. While there was a minor miscommunication over the 
exact paperwork required, there was never any documented dispute over whether or how 
the restoration and corrected compliance would occur, and warnings of possible credit 
recapture by TDHCA appear more as a matter of procedure and less an example of overt 
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pressure put upon SCALP by the agency. Ultimately, Sandpiper Cove was repaired and 
reoccupied well ahead of its federal deadline. 
 
Sandpiper Cove and the Public Housing Struggle 
As previously discussed, neither primary nor secondary data collection yielded any 
indication that the opponents of public housing restoration in Galveston, whether those in 
public agencies or independent advocacy organizations, had any involvement in the 
restoration of Sandpiper Cove following Hurricane Ike. Potentially hostile public agencies 
such as the GHA and City Council had no direct authority over LIHTC housing, and 
Sandpiper Cove had already been restored and reoccupied for two years by the time the 
Galveston Open Government Project filed its first lawsuit in late 2012. I was surprised to 
find, however, that Sandpiper Cove had played a significant role in the discourse and 
struggle over public housing resilience, which I had overlooked in my background research 
as I did not yet recognize the LIHTC project by name. 
Concentration of poverty. By the summer of 2012, opponents of public housing 
restoration occupied the mayor’s office, the GHA Board of Directors, and City Council, 
but Galveston remained obligated by complete restoration according to the terms of the 
Conciliation Agreement. From March to September, 2013, City Council spent $15,000 to 
commission Kirk McClure, professor of urban planning at the University of Kansas, to 
analyze census data and suggest high opportunity areas in which to locate the scattered-site 
units to be built as part of the restoration plan (Smith, 2013). McClure found no census 
tracts that met all of his criteria to be considered high opportunity areas, and concluded that 
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such areas are more likely to be found on the mainland. Though opponents had framed 
their position in these terms before, McClure’s study provided additional leverage for this 
argument, and City Council representative Norman Pappous voiced a desire to revisit the 
possibility of reneging on all previous commitments to restore lost public housing due to 
its findings (Smith, 2013). 
 According to housing expert john. a. powell, an approach based on access to 
opportunities “should deliberately connect affordable or assisted housing to regional 
opportunities, such as high performing schools, meaningful employment, viable 
transportation, quality childcare, responsive health care, and other institutions that facilitate 
civic and political activity” (powell 2005, p. 123). While the aim of McClure’s study is to 
assess access to opportunity, it relies on demographic analysis of resident populations as 
proxies for opportunity indicators. For example, adult educational attainment is used in 
place of the availability of high quality schools and the unemployment rate in place of an 
analysis of the local job market. Of course, the issue is not that there is no arguable 
correlation between demographics and opportunity, but that the substance of the study is 
actually concerned with the related but distinct issue of poverty concentration—although 
in either case, the right of residents to return home is not necessarily outweighed by even 
a supposedly benevolent relocation agenda. 
 By this time, GHA had applied to TDHCA for LIHTCs to help fund the 
construction of a mixed-income housing project on one of its former public housing sites. 
Ahead of the September, 2013, meeting of the governing board of TDHCA during which 
this application was to be considered, opponents including Councilman Pappous and David 
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Stanowski of GOGP wrote letters to TDHCA to be included as public comment, urging 
TDHCA to reject GHA’s requests (TDHCA, 2013). In one letter, a pair of local property 
owners cited McClure’s study as support for their position. In his letter, Stanowski based 
much of his argument on the existence of the largest remaining low-income housing 
development in the area since the bulldozing of public housing nearly five years prior: the 
“infamous and notorious Sandpiper Cove.” 
Stanowski repeated this argument when GOGP filed its lawsuit toward the same 
end that December (GOGP v. HUD, 2013). Presented as Exhibit 41 in the lawsuit was the 
affidavit of retired City of Galveston Police Chief Charles Wiley, in which Wiley argued 
that Sandpiper Cove “houses a population that is similar to what I have found in many 
public housing developments. Sandpiper is and has been one of the worst crime problems 
for the officers of Galveston Police Department to deal with” (Wiley, 2013). The 
implication was that public housing restoration would be inappropriate not due to the 
absence of opportunity, but due to the presence of crime among current residents and the 
assumption that prospective residents would create more of it. 
 The use of the existence of Sandpiper Cove as a major justification against even a 
mixed-income form of public housing restoration produced a struggle not only over 
whether existing poverty was a sufficient reason to block those efforts but over the concept 
of poverty concentration itself and the appropriate scale at which to measure it. Stanowski 
(2012) argued that a mixed-income project was not a sufficient solution, writing that “fair-
housing experts see opportunity arising from the resources available and people residing 
in a neighborhood, not just their apartment building; an area that is too small to be 
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meaningful.” Advocates such as Karl Eschbach, director of population research for the 
University of Texas Medical Branch, agreed that the site scale would have been too small, 
but argued that the neighborhood as defined by public housing opponents was also too 
small. According to Eschbach, “the theory was developed for places [with] poverty for 
miles in every direction [and] you just couldn’t get out…. A person living [in Galveston] 
can walk four or five blocks to Broadway and catch a bus to a job” (Smith, 2013). Eschbach 
simply called this “diversity.” 
In his speech at the project groundbreaking on September 10, 2014, GHA Chair 
Buddy Herz, who had long opposed the reconstruction of public housing, explained how a 
solution had been reached that seemed to satisfy him, if not the GOGP (GCDN, 2014). 
GHA would attach restrictive covenants to the site limiting the total number of public 
housing units both to 50 percent of the pre-storm figure and 50 percent of the total number 
of units on the site. Rental vouchers would not be accepted for the market-rate units to 
prevent a de facto full restoration of public housing. While both advocates and opponents 
had argued that the site was simply too small a scale at which to consider poverty 
concentration, advocates using this argument to justify full restoration and opponents to 
justify a complete dismantling of public housing, GHA simply split the difference, 
producing what Herz called “real mixed income”—with Sandpiper Cove remaining 
nearby. 
 The public/private dichotomy. When Stanley Lowe had become the new GHA 
executive director in March of 2012, he reported that Sandpiper Cove was high on his 
“short list of pressing concerns” (Smith, 2012a). Of course, Sandpiper Cove was privately 
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developed and managed, and local government had little leverage over its operations. Lowe 
complained that, despite the lack of GHA oversight due to Sandpiper Cove’s receipt of 
project-based vouchers directly from HUD, the reputation of GHA was suffering due to 
the negative reputation of Sandpiper Cove. To ameliorate this, Lowe was “attempting to 
get leaders… and the rest of the interested community talking about Sandpiper Cove” 
(Smith, 2012a). In this regard, at least, Lowe seems to have been successful. 
That May, the Galveston County Daily News (GCDN) published an editorial citing 
problems of crime at Sandpiper Cove and again noting Lowe’s displeasure with its effect 
on GHA’s reputation (Taylor, 2012a). The editorial seemed supportive of his position, 
pointing out that, since Hurricane Ike, most of the remaining public housing in Galveston 
are home to seniors and disabled people and are unlikely to be the source of any negative 
reputation. “In Galveston there’s a widespread view that crime is high in apartment 
complexes managed by public agencies and low in those managed by private companies,” 
according to the article. “Sandpiper Cove is evidence that the ‘private good public bad’ 
theory needs revision.” In June, GCDN published a guest column by a local resident who 
expanded on the critique: 
All of this makes an argument for some form of local control over whatever 
happens with federally funded housing. If we implement the “not another unit plan” 
we will have no form of local control and you can bet your bottom dollar the private 
landlords are not going to care for any of the social issues involved in public 
housing…. [D]o we want to dissolve the GHA in favor of the voucher system and 
private ownership, or does the city government want some level of control over the 
federal government spending here on housing? (Wilson, 2012) 
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In other words, complaints against Sandpiper Cove were transformed into support for an 
argument in favor of the restoration of traditional public housing in Galveston, where 
public oversight could be stronger. 
 The next month, however, GCDN published a guest column by Buddy Herz in 
which the GHA chair made it clear that he did not share this view. In the article, Herz 
argued that the terms of the Conciliation Agreement should be considered satisfied by the 
provision of rental vouchers, counting not only GHA-administered tenant-based rental 
vouchers—many of which were only temporarily allocated under the federal Disaster 
Housing Assistance Program (Taylor, 2012b)—but also what Herz called “privately owned 
public housing” such as Sandpiper Cove (Herz, 2012). While Stanley Lowe had wanted to 
clearly distinguish between public and other forms of subsidized housing, Herz sought to 
deliberately conflate them in an effort to create the impression that restoration was not 
needed. 
Pressure against Sandpiper Cove. Although the institutional frameworks around 
each differed significantly, it appears that Sandpiper Cove had no lesser degree of name 
recognition among local low-income housing opponents than its public housing 
counterparts. The prominent place occupied by Sandpiper Cove in the discourse and 
struggle over public housing restoration suggests that a similar sort of political pressure 
could have challenged the resilience of Sandpiper Cove if an opportunity for actualization 
had been realized immediately after Hurricane Ike. In fact, a potential opportunity had been 
identified by Stanley Lowe, who noted that Sandpiper Cove’s federally-administered 
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project-based rental vouchers were being renewed on a yearly basis and implied that 
stakeholders could petition HUD to deny their renewal (Smith, 2012a). 
Perhaps due to the continued focus on the struggle over public housing restoration, 
it does not appear that this tactic was pursued. However, two years later, and just one week 
after the groundbreaking ceremony for the new mixed-income GHA development, GCDN 
published an editorial that described persistent criminal and police activity at Sandpiper 
Cove and proposed that Lowe’s idea to block its voucher renewal be considered once again 
(Taylor, 2014a). The editor argued that this tactic “would be more productive than getting 
into yet another long, pointless discussion about the political theory behind public housing 
while giving private landlords a pass.” While the editor proposed that blocking the voucher 
renewal could be used as leverage to force SCALP to invest in measures to reduce crime, 
David Stanowski of GOGP seemed to take a less nuanced approach. Several days later, 
Stanowski submitted a letter to Galveston City Council, citing the GCDN editorial and 
arguing that, whether it was publicly or privately owned, Sandpiper Cove was another 
example of concentrated poverty that would not be ameliorated through the introduction of 
new mixed-income housing nearby. He simply called on City Council to “shutdown [sic] 
Sandpiper Cove” without elaborating on what it would have meant to do so or what the 
outcome might have been. 
In November 2014, GCDN published another editorial criticizing not only 
Sandpiper Cove and its owners for its high rate of crime reports but also the notion of 
project-based rental vouchers themselves for concentrating poverty at a single site (Taylor, 
2014b). The editor reported that Sandpiper Cove was in the process of being purchased, 
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and that this might present a viable opportunity for the exercise of local control over the 
project. Not only would City Council have the opportunity to interact with the new owners 
and pressure them to address issues of crime, but it might also have been an opportunity to 
arrange the replacement of its HUD-administered project-based rental vouchers with GHA-
administered tenant-based rental vouchers and position the GHA within the institutional 
framework of Sandpiper Cove. 
The future of Sandpiper Cove. According to the Galveston County Appraisal 
District (2016), Sandpiper Cove was sold by SCALP to Compass Point Galveston, I, Ltd., 
a subsidiary of the Cleveland-based Millennia Housing Management, on March 23, 2015. 
A new property manager had arrived on site in June and quickly began enforcing certain 
rules—as well as its eviction policy—more strictly, resulting in mixed reactions from 
residents (Barnett, 2015). Meanwhile, the office and community center had been 
remodeled, a computer lab had been added, and the new owners had hosted at least one 
event for residents and their children and were discussing the possibility of future events 
(Barnett, 2015). 
 Ahead of the sale, Millennia Housing Management had applied for $1.5M in new 
LIHTCs for renovations to Sandpiper Cove, for which TDHCA had given administrative 
approval (TDHCA, 2016c). On February 12, 2015, Millennia Vice President Greg 
Bierbaum presented plans for the rehabilitation work—including a $200,000 security 
plan—for which the LIHTCs were being sought, and requested the Council’s endorsement 
of their tax credit application (Ferguson, 2015). Bierbaum returned on January 14, 2016, 
this time with three other Millennia representatives, informing the Council that tax credits 
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were anticipated to be awarded that June, and that renovation would take between 12 and 
14 months (Galveston City Council, 2016a). It was also reported that crime reports had 
reduced in frequency in recent months. On January 28, City Council unanimously approved 
a resolution to convey the City of Galveston’s support for Millenia’s tax credit application 
to TDHCA (Galveston City Council 2016b; 2016c). 
 In consideration of the future resilience of Sandpiper Cove, now renamed Compass 
Point, it is important to note that the institutional framework was largely unchanged. Its 
new owner was the subsidiary of a national, out-of-state property management company 
and was created for the express purpose of obtaining tax credits for a development that 
company was to manage. It was to be subject to compliance monitoring by TDHCA and, 
though it obtained support from the City of Galveston, was not obligated to any local public 
agencies. It would also retain its controversial federally-administered project-based rental 
vouchers through the sale and, according to a HUD spokesperson, “it would take time to 
determine … whether local officials would have an opportunity to influence how the 
project is funded and managed in the future” (Smith, 2014). 
Millennia Housing Management development manager Valery Geraghty argued 
that Millennia president Frank Sinito would, unlike former owner Robert Rohlwing, be 
closely involved with the project and would be seen on site (Smith, 2014). However, it is 
noteworthy that, at the time, Millennia managed over 10,000 residential units across several 
states, and Sinoto resided in Cleveland, Ohio. Whether this hands-on management style 
would materialize is uncertain. 
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 Given these factors, what can be anticipated should another hurricane make landfall 
on Galveston Island and deal significant damage to Sandpiper Cove? From the standpoint 
of the new owners, it may be fairly straightforward: file an insurance claim, use the 
proceeds to fund repairs, lose income while the apartments are unoccupied, and return to a 
positive cash flow once tenants, backed by rental vouchers, return. Presumably, Millennia 
purchased Sandpiper Cove with the intention of retaining its income and rent restrictions 
because they assessed it to be the most profitable positioning the local real estate market 
would bear. Perhaps this would be different should that market heat up in the coming years. 
For local opponents of low-income housing, it may be a struggle to locate a source of 
leverage due to the City’s voluntary support for the acquisition-rehabilitation and the 
associated security plan. Of course, the tactic of pressuring HUD to deny its voucher 
renewal has not been tested, and a reinvigorated GOGP could choose to pursue it through 
litigation. For residents, who would bear the real cost of such events, resilience is a more 





Neoliberal housing policy poses distinct threats to low income housing that have 
been actualized through natural disaster in a diverse array of cases, often catalyzing 
struggles for resilience. Tracing the way in which this was manifest in public housing in 
Galveston through Hurricane Ike established the context for inquiry into LIHTC housing 
and resilience in the same context. Through the research design, I articulated questions 
about LIHTC housing and resilience and presented a methodology to begin to find answers 
to these questions. The findings of this research revealed some of the contingencies upon 
which the actualization of latent threats to resilience may depend, which themselves 
challenge constructs of affordability and disaster resilience in the neoliberal context. 
Sandpiper Cove, the only extant LIHTC development in Galveston through 
Hurricane Ike, shared several key vulnerabilities with public housing and perhaps with 
other privately-owned housing north of Galveston’s “environmental and socioeconomic 
dividing line” (Wild, 2009). These vulnerabilities included not only the physical exposure 
risk of bay-side storm surge and the social vulnerabilities of residents, but also the 
vulnerabilities embedded in political and economic pressures to dislodge low-income 
housing as a geographic impediment to local markets. Hurricane Ike actualized some of 
these vulnerabilities, damaging over half of the units at Sandpiper Cove, displacing 
residents from all of them for many months and some permanently. 
 It appeared that the institutional framework around LIHTC housing did not, 
however, enable the actualization of political and economic pressures to permanently 
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dismantle Sandpiper Cove as a source of affordable low-income housing before restoration 
had already taken place. Sandpiper Cove’s private owners filed an insurance claim, used 
the proceeds to make repairs, and brought the development back into compliance with 
regulations before TDHCA, the primary agency responsible, had even begun its monitoring 
process. In this case, the lack of local government control over Sandpiper Cove spared it 
from the actualization of political and economic pressures seen in the hostile approach of 
the GHA, the mayor, and City Council toward public housing in Galveston. However, had 
market conditions incentivized the owners and investors of Sandpiper Cove to use 
Hurricane Ike as an opportunity to exit the LIHTC program and reposition the development 
despite the consequences of credit recapture, residents may have had a difficult time 
accessing resources for resilience through the local public agencies accountable to them. It 
is not known whether or how residents worked to secure their own resilience through the 
restoration of their home at Sandpiper Cove. Perhaps, in another scenario, the advocates 
who became party to the institutional framework around public housing would have 
become similarly involved. 
 Sandpiper Cove began accepting returning residents much sooner than federal law 
required, and much sooner than any public housing had been restored, much of which is 
still incomplete. However, despite the limitations of the methodology used to estimate 
resident return, it is clear many residents were still unable to return within this timescale. 
Post-disaster relocation decisions at the individual and household level are complex (Levin 
et al., 2007), and it is not known how permanently displaced residents sought shelter, 
whether they were able to find alternative affordable housing nearby, or whether they were 
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displaced from Galveston entirely. In fact, it is possible that some found homes in 
developments funded by new LIHTCs awarded in Galveston after the storm. Presumably, 
new Sandpiper Cove residents were in as much need for affordable housing as those 
displaced, and some may have been displaced from their own former homes. Regardless, 
it is important to consider for whom affordable housing provided a resource for resilience 
and how this may affect articulations of such constructs. 
 Considerations of other characteristics of housing are of additional importance to 
considerations of resilience. Sandpiper Cove was characterized, both before and after 
Hurricane Ike, as a dangerous high-crime development in a neighborhood with few 
opportunities for residents. Regardless of the contested nature of these claims, they must 
be taken seriously as essential to the definition of housing as a resource for resilience, not 
only to hurricanes and capitalist pressures, but also to the everyday challenges of life for 
low-income people. Housing and housing provision systems that are resistant to external 
pressures and shocks but that do not facilitate the social resilience of their residents cannot 
be considered such resources. This is of valid concern given the critiques of LIHTC siting 
patterns across the United States, including those in geographies not subject to 
meteorological or seismic threats. 
Finally, the role of adaptation within constructs of resilience must be considered. 
Constructs of resilience often articulate that it should not be simply defined by a return to 
some initial state that would enable similar actualizations of vulnerabilities the next time a 
disaster or shock occurs. A resilient system may be better defined as one that adapts and 
changes to become better prepared for future events. In the case of public housing in 
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Galveston, despite the incomplete process of restoration, the addition of the Conciliation 
Agreement and the leverage of public agencies behind it appears to have served as an 
instrumental addition to the institutional framework around it that may contribute to its 
function as a resource for resilience. In the case of Sandpiper Cove, because processes of 
restoration were relatively straightforward and involved no evident struggle, the 
institutional frameworks around it did not have reason to adapt or change. This leaves 
future scenarios as contingent on calculations of market opportunities for its owners and 
the availability of opportunities to actualize political pressure by opponents as it was 
through Hurricane Ike. Resilience cannot be so precarious. 
 
Further Research 
 In this thesis, I found that Hurricane Ike did not serve as an opportunity for LIHTC 
housing in Galveston to be dismantled or repositioned as a result of political or market 
pressures. However, future research might seek to further examine the contingencies that 
may result in different outcomes in other historical geographies and challenge the resilience 
of low-income residents. Is it reasonable to imagine a scenario in which local housing 
market conditions change so rapidly as to justify the cost of recapture and other investor 
penalties in order to pursue market rents? Such research might calculate the total value of 
credits at risk of recapture and thus the rent increases required to compensate for this 
penalty, comparing this increase to actual local rental market conditions to determine 
whether owners could reasonably expect to profit from a repositioning. These calculations 
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would also be affected by whether or not the development relies on rental vouchers, as was 
the case at Sandpiper Cove. 
Prior to this research, it does not appear that much was known about the resilience 
of LIHTC housing and its residents to market and neoliberal political pressures actualized 
through natural disaster. This study addresses, but does not fully ameliorate this gap in 
scholarly research and knowledge, necessitating further research. If the LIHTC is to remain 
among the primary tools for the development of affordable low-income housing in the 
United States, its potential to produce sites of vulnerability or resilience to natural disasters, 
market conditions, and political pressure must be fully understood in order for 
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